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INTRODUCTION

Beginning in the late 1960's with the CarterfoneI and Microwave
Communications, Inc. 2 decisions, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) launched what has been described as a reformulation of telecommunications regulation. 3 By mandating the interconnection of independently
produced peripheral equipment and by permitting specialized common carriers to compete with the AT&T long lines for intercity private line business,
the Commission signalled a reorientation of the FCC's regulatory policy
toward introducing new competition into the telecommunications market. It
has been the FCC's view in these and subsequent proceedings that the public
interest would best be served by opening the door to new providers of
communications services. With some notable limitations, 4 it has pursued
1. Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, 13 F.C.C.2d 420
(1968). In the Carterfone decision, AT&T sought to prohibit by tariffs the use of a privately
manufactured device which connected the telephone land line system with mobile radio systems. AT&T contended that in view of its "responsibility to establish, operate and improve the
telephone system, they must have absolute control over the quality, installation, and maintenance of all parts of the system." Id. at 424. The Commission held the imposition of the tariffs
to be unreasonable, discriminatory and unlawful in that AT&T had made "no adequate showing
that nonharmful interconnection must be prohibited in order to permit the telephone company
to carry out its system responsibilities." Id. at 424. The Commission further held that the tariffs
had been unreasonable, unlawful and discriminatory since their inception and ordered that they
be stricken and given no further effect. Id.
2. Applications of Microwave Communications, Inc. (MCI), 18 F.C.C.2d 953 (1969),
reconsiderationdenied, 21 F.C.C.2d 190 (1970). In the MCI decision, application was made by a
small corporation to the FCC for permits to establish a microwave radio service for small
business interoffice and interplant communications. Although such service was already provided by the established carriers, the proposed system would provide lower rates by means of
party lines and half-time use. The FCC, acknowledging that it was "a very close case,"
nonetheless approved the application after concluding that there was a need for the system, that
it would be technically feasible, efficient and reliable, and that the firm providing the service
was financially qualified to construct and operate the service. Id.
The MCI decision was expanded by the Commission's recognition of a general category of
"specialized common carriers" providing private line services and facilities. Establishment of
Policies and Procedures for Consideration of Applications to Provide Specialized Common
Carrier Services in the Domestic Public Point-to-Point Microwave Radio Service, 29 F.C.C.2d
870, aff'd sub nom. Washington Util. & Transp. Comm'n v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1976).
3. See, e.g., Comment, FCC Regulation of Domestic Computer Communications: A
Competitive Reformation, 22 BUFFALO L. REV. 947, 962-84 (1973).
4. See, e.g., MCI Telecommunications Corp., 60 F.C.C.2d 25 (1976), rev'd sub nom. MCI
Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 781
(1978).
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this policy since 1968, much to the dismay of some established actors in the
telecommunications field.
This competitive reformulation has been in large part a response to the
ferment taking place in the communications equipment market.5 With increasing national prosperity and the explosion in telecommunications technology that has occurred since World War II, new and more sophisticated
opportunities have arisen for accommodating the needs of the familiar

mouth-to-ear forms of communication. Furthermore, a new range of
capacities in data processing and computer technology has multiplied the
possibilities for machine-to-machine communication. New forms of
communications services have grown around these technologies. In turn,
these new services and technologies have begun to merge with dynamic
technical and service developments in the broadcasting and computer arenas
to produce an integrated galaxy of "compunications" functions, 6 and it has
fallen to the FCC to develop regulatory policies to deal with this regrouping.
Part of the Commission's response has been to open to competition those
segments of the compunications market that fall within its jurisdiction.

The Commission has developed this competitive policy by analyzing
the possibilities for structuring the new options and consequences created by
the post-World War II telecommunications ferment, and it has been for the
most part the perennial political question of "who gets what, when ' 7 which
has informed this analysis. However, as with all regulatory actions by
administrative agencies, this edifice of policy rests on a legal base. In the
5. The extent to which the new policy toward competition stems from changes in the
Commission's composition or from political influences is beyond the scope of this Article.
However, the FCC's course in this area has been fairly steady under both Democratic and
Republican appointees and does not appear to be the product of one or another partisan
philosophy.
6. The term was coined by Anthony G. Oettinger in Compunications and the National
Decision-MakingProcess, in COMPUTERS, COMMUNICATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 74-113
(M. Greenberger ed. 1971). See also Berman & Oettinger, ChangingFunctions and Facilities:
The Politicsof InformationResources, 28 FED. COM. B.J. 227, 247-48 (1976). Alfred Kahn, then
Chairman of the New York Public Service Commission, noted: "The overwhelmingly significant consideration about the future organization of telecommunications, so far as I can see, is
the fact that its evolving technology is thoroughly demolishing the validity of the boundary lines
we have been drawing across the face of the industry." Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprintedin
The Great Telephorie Debate 72-76. This merger of technologies has occurred in one form or
another throughout the history of modem telecommunications; the computer-communications
merger is only the latest manifestation. For example, even at the time the Communications Act
of 1934 was passed, the process of technological merger was apparent, as can be seen in the
remarks of Rep. Merritt on the House floor during debate on the Act: "It developed as the
hearings [on the legislation] went on that by reason of improvements and inventions and the
mechanical part of the service, telephone and telegraph and radio are becoming more and more
interconnected, so that it is hardly possible to regulate one without regulating the other." 78
CONG. REC. 10316 (1934).
7. H. LASSWELL, POLmCS-WHo GETS WHAT, WHEN, How (1936).
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telecommunications area, that legal base is the Communications Act of

1934.8 Although the Communications Act historically has presented few
difficult questions of law that might limit the range of policy options open to
the Commission in structuring compunications markets, 9 parties attacking
the procompetition decisions have argued that there are specific policy
directives in the Communications Act barring the FCC from acting in a
manner that promotes competition, at least in the peripheral equipment and

specialized common carrier fields. 10 The contention is that there are limits of
law imposed on the policy discretion of the FCC.
This Article will examine these questions about the governing law of
telecommunications and compunications. 11 Part II describes the development of telecommunications regulation from the invention of the telephone in 1876 through the enactment of the Communications Act of 1934,
focusing on the evolution of the federal regulatory structure and the substan-

tive law which it has applied. Beginning with this basic historical
framework, Parts III and IV undertake to outline and then analyze the two

principal competing views regarding the mandate of the Communications
Act toward the telecommunications market structure. Part In discusses the
prevailing view that the FCC is free to exercise an essentially boundless
discretion in overseeing telecommunications developments. Part IV ex-

plores a novel interpretation of the Act, advanced with increasing frequency
by the established carriers and state regulators, which identifies provisions

in the statute that would bar the FCC from permitting competition which
threatens duplication of, or economic or technical harm to, the services and
facilities of the monopoly shared by AT&T and the independent telephone
carriers. Part V then draws conclusions about these two alternatives, sug8. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 416, ch.
652, 48 Stat. 1064).
9. See, e.g., FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 93 (1953) (FCC's broad
powers over communications not limited by federal procompetition laws).
10. See text accompanying notes 149-250 infra; Domestic Common CarrierRegulation:
Hearings on H.R. 7047 Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the House Comm. on
InterstateandForeignCommerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (statement of Eugene V. Rostow
on behalf of AT&T); Brief for the National Association of Regulatory and Utility Commissioners (NARUC) at 29-41, Washington Util. & Transp. Comm. v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1976).
The attack on the procompetition policy is taking place in Congress as well as in the courts.
See House Panel Considers Major Overhaul of 1934 Communications Act, 35 CONo. Q. 1113
(June 4, 1977). Compare Consumer Communications Reform Act of 1977, H.R. 8, H.R. 513,
95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977) (designed to undo the Carterfone-MCIline of cases) with H.R. Res.
285, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (expressing congressional approval of the procompetition
developments).
11. In dealing with the new competition doctrine, it is important to keep in mind the
distinction between law and policy. The question at issue here is not which choice among
available policies might optimize the structure and performance of the communications industry, but what limits on the range of those choices are imposed on the FCC by the terms of the
Communications Act itself.
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gesting that the single reliable lesson to be learned from studying the
Communications Act is that Congress has failed to provide any useful
guidance to regulators and courts faced with the critical job of allocating
opportunities in a fluid, rapidly evolving compunications environment.
I.

THE

LAW

OF COMMUNICATIONS REGULATION: THE GENESIS OF

THE COMMUNICATIONS

ACT

OF

1934

Assessing the implications of the Communications Act with respect to
competition in the telecommunications area is not easy. The Act is remarkable for its non-specificity, 12 and even the regulatory scheme for wire
communications, which is laid out in more detail than that for broadcasting,
provides no immediate answers to the problem. It is only by interpreting the
legislative history and construing the statutory language that the national
policy for telecommunications set forth by Congress in 1934 can be discerned. Although this process of historical interpretation can be haphazard, the
task is nonetheless central in determining whether the FCC is authorized to
act as it has in the policy-making sphere. The predominant view of the Act is
that it was intended simply to centralize scattered regulatory authorities over
portions of the communications industry in one body, the FCC, without
significantly altering the substantive law or the established policies created
under predecessor statutes. 13 Under this interpretation, the Act must be seen
as mostly form and not substance, and the legislative enactments prior to
1934 from which it was composed become critical for deciding what policy
was to be carried forward by the new Commission when it assumed power in
1934.
A.

FederalRegulation Priorto 1934.
For the first seventeen years following the invention of the telephone in
1876, the Bell company monopoly on telephone service was protected under
the patent laws. 14 When those patents expired in 1893-94, a new group of
independent competitors, now free to make use of telephone technology,
gave birth to a period of intense competition in local telephone services.
This resulted in a massive increase in the number of telephones in service
and brought the independents within close range of the Bell companies in
total connections. 15 Within a decade of the expiration of the patents, AT&T
began to use its superior financial and geographic resources to take over a
large number of competitors and to make the going difficult for the rest by
12. See, e.g., IV B. SCHWARTZ, THE ECONOMIC REGULATION OF BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY
2374 (1973); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION ACTION 49 (1965).
13. See text accompanying notes 110-48 infra.
14. For the fascinating history of the invention of the telephone and the complex patent

litigation it engendered, see Note, The Law and the Telephone, 50 AM. L. REV. 425 (1916).
15. Gabel, The Early Competitive Era in Telephone Communication, 1893-1920, 34 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 340, 455 (1969).
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refusing to connect independents into its local and long-distance lines,
which were becoming increasingly important as the availability of telephone
service expanded. It was not until the Justice Department under President
Wilson intervened in 1913 that this fierce competitive phase cooled, 1 6 and,
until the latest stages of the post-patent competitive period, communications
17
service remained practically unregulated by federal authority.

1. The Mann-Elkins Act.

Communications services were first

18
brought under federal regulatory supervision by the Mann-Elkins Act of

1910, which gave the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) jurisdiction
over interstate rates charged by "telegraph, telephone, and cable
companies." 19 The Act provided to parties aggrieved by rates charged for
communications services the right to complain to the ICC, which then could

investigate and, upon concluding that the rates were "unjust" and "unreasonable," declare the charge unlawful.20 This incorporation of communication services into the jurisdiction of the ICC was accomplished by a
sparsely explained addition to an act designed to regulate sleeping-car
companies and other transportation carriers, thereby setting the tone for the
regulation of communications services that lasted until the New Deal.
The process by which this came about seems from the record almost

casual. The principal provisions of the Mann-Elkins Act, designed to redeem part of the Republican platform on which President Taft had been
elected, 2 1 established a special Commerce Court for handling ICC appeals
and expanded the power of the ICC over the railroads. 22 Neither the House

Report23 nor the Senate Report24 that accompanied the respective versions of
16. This cooling came as the result of an agreement entered between the Justice Department and AT&T known as the Kingsbury Commitment, discussed in notes 59-61 infra.
17. One caveat is in order. It is not entirely true that the federal government played no early
regulatory role, although this is clearly the view which dominates the commentary on the early
competitive period of the telephone. See, e.g, Gabel, supra note 15. The federal courts in this
era engaged in a roundabout form of regulation by using the fourteenth amendment protection
of property aggressively to control state rate-setting bodies. See J. BAUER, TRANSFORMING
PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 64-69 (1950); J. Sichter, Separations Procedures in The Telephone
Industry: The Historical Origins of a Public Policy 11-12 (unpublished article distributed by the
Harv. Prog. on Information Resources Policy, 1977). Sichter notes that the effect of this federal
court intervention on early state regulation was "devastating." Id.
18. Commerce Court (Mann-Elkins) Act, Pub. L. No. 218, ch. 309, § 7, 36 Stat. 544 (1910)
(amending Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, § 1, 24 Stat. 379 (1887)) (provisions
relating to telegraph, telephone and cable companies repealed 1934).
19. Mann-Elkins Act, Pub. L. No. 218, ch. 309, § 7, 36 Stat. 544-45 (1910) (provisions
relating to telegraph, telephone and cable companies repealed 1934).
20. Id.
21. H.R. REP. No. 923, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1910).
22. See the discussion of the Mann-Elkins Act in II B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 12, at 100709.
23. H.R. REP. No. 923, supra note 21.
24. S. REP. No. 355, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. (1910).
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the bill to the floor in each chamber contained any reference at all to
telephone or telegraph, and no proposal to consider telecommunications
technology had been made during committee hearings. 25 The first mention
in the record of regulation of telecommunications services did not occur
until mid-way through the House debate on the railroad bill, when 'an
amendment was offered to include "telegraph and telephone companies"
within the definition of the common carriers to be regulated by the Interstate

Commerce Act. 26 Its sponsor argued only that "there is no reason why these
great instrumentalities of commerce should not . . . be put within the
provisions of the interstate commerce act" 27 and that "these necessary
instrumentalities which the citizens have to use, which are monopolies in
their particular lines of business [should] be required to make reasonable

charges";28 at no point were any specific abuses cited in the House consideration of the amendment. Even Chairman Mann agreed that regulation
of telephone and telegraph was "desirable,' '29 although he argued strenuously against the amendment being grafted onto the railroad-oriented bill
amending the Interstate Commerce Act. 30 Despite Mann's opposition, the
31
amendment was passed with relative ease after a short debate.
The same procedure was followed, with a deceptive twist, during
Senate consideration of the Mann-Elkins Act. Again, after no consideration
of telephone and telegraph issues by the committee that reported the bill, the

"Dixon amendment" was offered to bring "telegraph, telephone, and cable
companies" within the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commis-

sion. 32 Its sponsor, misinforming the Senate that a similar provision had
25. 45 CONG. REC. 5534-35 (1910) (remarks of Rep. Townsend).
26. 45 CONG. REc. 5533 (1910) (remarks of Rep. Bartlett).
27. Id.
28. Id. Other supporters of the amendment were hardly more specific. See id. 5534
(remarks of Rep. Underwood) ("[We cannot afford to turn our backs on [the amendment] and
refuse to bring the great telegraph and telephone lines in this country within the terms of the
interstate commerce act, so that they may be properly and fairly regulated in the interest of the
great commercial life of the Nation"); id. 5536 (remarks of Rep. Fitzgerald) ("inhere is a
persistent, a strong, and a reasonable demand throughout the country for some proper supervision of telegraph and telephone companies"); id. (remarks of Rep. Hobson) ("To leave them
unregulated is to leave private corporations with the power to tax the people at will. . . .The
whole domain of the distributing system in a great organism like a nation should be brought
under the control of the regulating system-the Government").
29. Id. 5533 (remarks of Rep. Mann).
30. "[H]ow ridiculous it is to stick into the [bill] something which has nothing to do with
either passengers or property. It amounts to nothing. It is an advertisement only of our own
incompetency, of our incapacity for legislation." Id.
31. Id. 5537. The final House vote was 109-76.
32. The original version of the amendment, sponsored by Senator Dixon, ran over nine
pages, although it did nothing more than reenact section 1 of the Interstate Commerce Act and
add telephone, telegraph and cable companies to its purview. This caused some consternation
among Senators who were being forced to vote on such a lengthy measure without having time
to consider it, and a motion to table the Dixon amendment was made but defeated, 22-37.
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been reported unanimously by the House Committee and that it had passed
the House without a division vote, echoed the generalized reasoning used in
support of the amendment in the House: "the interstate telegraph and
telephone companies are about the only remaining public service corporations engaged in interstate commerce that are not under the control of the
Interstate Commerce Commission. " 33 Again, the committee chairman presiding over the bill argued against its adoption, saying that the problems of
communications should be considered separately and at more length than the
Dixon amendment provided.34 However, the amendment passed by a sub35
stantial majority.
When the conference report 36 returned to the Senate, no time was spent
discussing the new proposal regulating communications services. Senator
Elkins, in explaining the conference report, noted that "[i]t extends the
principle of rate legislation which requires all rates to be just and reasonable
and free from unjust discrimination to telephone and telegraph companies as
well as to carriers," 37 but the subject was not brought up again and the
conference measure passed without a roll call.
Why the apparent consensus that telegraph and telephone companies
should be regulated by the federal government had developed by 1910 is not
clear from the record. There was some expression of populist sentiment, 3
some suggestion that rates had been set unfairly or even predatorily 39 and
some indication that the proregulatory view that emerged during the Progressive era and first bore fruit in the regulation of interstate railroads was
40
thought to apply automatically to communications carriers as well.
Senator LaFollette then offered a simple substitute adding telecommunications companies to
ICC jurisdiction, which was adopted by voice vote. Id. 6975-76.
33. Id. 6973 (remarks of Sen. Dixon). No other Senator spoke in support of the amendment, although Senator Lodge expressed "no objection" to regulation of telephone and
telegraph companies. Id. 6976.
There is one indication in the Senate debate of the source from which pressure for the
amendment may have come. Senator Dixon inserted a letter from the National Independent
Telephone Association accusing the Bell System of being an "unfair competitor" and using
"outrageous methods of warfare" against the independents. The letter pointed particularly to
discrimination in long-distance rates and below-cost pricing allegedly practiced by Bell to drive
out competitors, and claimed that federal supervision would eliminate these wrongs. Id. 697374.
34. Id. 6975 (remarks of Sen. Elkins). However, after a division vote indicating substantial
support for federal regulation, Senator Elkins agreed to accept the LaFollette substitute.
35. See note 32 supra.
36. S. Doc. No. 623, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. (1910), reprinted at 45 CONG. REC. 8134-42
(1910).
37. 45 CONG. REC. 8240 (1910) (remarks of Sen. Elkins).
38. See id. 5536 (remarks of Reps. Hobson & Fitzgerald).
39. See id. 6973-74 (letter from National Independent Telephone Association); id. 8240

(remarks of Sen. Elkins).
40. See id. 5533 (remarks of Rep. Bartlett); text accompanying note 27 supra. One of the
larger mysteries surrounding the Mann-Elkins telephone and telegraph amendments is the role
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Perhaps the fact that the communications company amendment to the MannElkins Act produced no real regulation of telephone and telegraph services
in the twenty-five years the ICC had jurisdiction over telephone and telegraph companies 41 indicates that, whatever the guiding reasons may have
been for extending federal authority to communications in 1910, no large
wave of public sentiment demanded it. But why the ICC was to regulate the
providers of interstate telephone and telegraph services is no more apparent
from the congressional consideration of the problem than is the policy that
the Commission was to follow in exercising its supervisory jurisdiction. The
most that can be said is that whatever Congress had established in 1887 as
the regulatory policy for nineteenth century barge and rail traffic was, after
1910, to apply to telephones and telegraphs as well, although this can only
be inferred from the amendment of the Mann-Elkins Act and not found in
any expression of the House or Senate as to what the regulatory scheme was
to be.
2. The Transportation (Esch-Cummins) Act of 1920. The MannElkins amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act remained the statutory
authority for federal regulation of telecommunications for ten years. 42 In
1920, while developing legislation to return the railroads to private ownership from wartime government control, Congress revamped the Interstate
Commerce Act to extend federal regulation of surface transportation even
further through the Transportation (Esch-Cummins) Act of 1920. 3 The
played by AT&T and its dynamic President, Theodore Vail. Not long before 1910, Vail began to
defuse the Bell System's resistance to state regulation, suggesting that regulation could work to
the benefit instead of the detriment of AT&T. See AT&T ANNUAL REPORT 14-18 (1907). See

note 179 infra. Although it may appear unlikely that historical proximity between the emergence of Vail's proregulatory view and the 1910 amendments is coincidental, the historical

evidence is silent.
41.

See text accompanying notes 82-84 infra.

42. For twelve months in 1918-19, all wire communications facilities were taken over by the
government as a war emergency measure. Although managerial control was placed in the
Postmaster General and revenues were diverted to the Treasury, operation of the communications system remained effectively in the hands of the corporate executives of each company,
and no new regulatory policy emerged. See Note, The Telegraph Industry: Monopoly or
Competition, 51 YALE L.J. 629, 636 (1942).
The wartime operation of the communications system might well have been an

initial step towards a reasoned national communications policy. But in fact it was
merely a brief, unrelated hiatus in the haphazard accumulation of ad hoc legislation

made to substitute for policy. A few hours of cursory debate sufficed to hand over to

the Executive all the country's facilities for rapid communication. Brief hearings
followed by even less-as well as less relevant-debate marked the end of the
experiment.

Id. Upon return of the communications companies to private control, telephone and telegraph
service reverted to the regime of the Mann-Elkins amendments. Act of July 11, 1919, Ch. 10, 41

Stat. 157 (1919) (withdrawing government control of communications companies).
43. Transportation (Esch-Cummins) Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 152, ch. 91, § 400, 41 Stat.
474 (amending Mann-Elkins Act, Pub. L. No. 218, Ch. 309, § 7, 36 Stat. 544 (1910) (repealed
1934)).
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Esch-Cummins Act, like the Mann-Elkins Act, was almost exclusively
concerned with railroad issues; the statement of the policy of the Act44 refers
explicitly to rail and water transportation but makes no mention of
communications. 45 However, at least one change-although perhaps only
cosmetic-was made by the Esch-Cummins Act in the statutory language
relating to communications services: the jurisdiction of the ICC over "telegraph, telephone, and cable companies" was restated to encompass "[t]he

46
transmission of intelligence by wire or wireless. "
There is no discussion in the official record of this specific change in
48
47
the jurisdictional language. In fact, the Senate report, conference report,
and debate on the Esch-Cummins bill made no mention of communications
at all. Only in the House were the problems of communications carriers

addressed. The original version of the House bill had subjected communications companies to the full panoply of regulatory requirements aimed
primarily at railroad carriers, including the acquisition of a certificate of
convenience and necessity for extensions and abandonments, and a certificate for the issuance of stocks and bonds. 49 That part of the proposed
legislation drew heavy opposition in the House hearings 50 and was subsequently dropped in the bill reported from the committee. The committee
made it clear that no change in the regulatory scheme or the regulatory
policy previously applied to communications was contemplated, 5 1 and this
44. Among the stated policies of the Act was the preservation of competition wherever
possible. Esch-Cummins Act, Pub. L. No. 152, ch. 91, § 407, 41 Stat. 481 (1920) (repealed 1934).
See text accompanying note 190 infra.
45. "It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress to promote, encourage, and develop
water transportation, service, and facilities in connection with the commerce of the United
States, and to foster and preserve in full vigor both rail and water transportation." EschCummins Act, Pub. L. No. 152, ch. 91, § 500, 41 Stat. 499 (1920) (repealed 1934).
46. Id. § 400.
47. S. REP. No. 304, 66th Cong., Ist Sess. (1919).
48. H.R. REP. No. 650, 66th Cong., 2d Sess. (1920).
49. H.R. REP. No. 456, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (1919).
50. Return of the Railroadsto Private Ownership:Hearingson H.R. 4378 Before the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 66th Cong., Ist Sess. (1919); see, e.g., id. 2912
(statement of Edgar Clark on behalf of ICC) ("I am not prepared to say that there is at this time
any pressing public need for extending the proposed legislation to the telegraph and telephone
companies in the same manner and to the same extent that it is proposed to be extended for the
railroads and other carriers aside from the telegraph and telephone companies"); id. 1812-13
(statement of F.C. Stevens on behalf of Independent Telephone Association) ("Mhe railroad
industry needs fundamental legislation. The telephone industry does not. . . . [Sluch a statute
is not needed at present for public protection. There has been no abuse"). The telephone
carriers did not oppose regulation generally but urged that communications carriers be given
separate consideration and a separate statutory title. See id. 1785 (statement of F.B. MacKinnon on behalf of Independent Telephone Association) ("The telephone business. . . should be
given that same earnest study, that same careful consideration, that this committee has been
giving for the past weeks to the railroad problem. Our problem, we say, is not pressing"); id.
1788, 1793-94 (statement of N.C. Kingsbury on behalf of AT&T).
51. IThe committee left the control of wire systems practically as it was under the
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intent was reinforced by the exclusion of communications carriers from the
52
broad statement of policy incorporated in the Act.
Given this relatively clear intent not to alter existing ICC regulation or,
more accurately, nonregulation of communications carriers, 53 there is no
justification for reading more than mere cosmetic significance into the
restatement of ICC jurisdiction over the "transmission of intelligence by
wire or wireless." The most likely reason for the change was simply to
conform the statute to the scope of federal authority over interstate
communications as delineated by the Supreme Court in the 1877 decision in
PensacolaTelegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co. 54 The Pensacola Telegraph case had been alluded to briefly in the Mann-Elkins debates by
proponents of the Dixon amendment to include telephone and telegraph
within ICC jurisdiction,5 5 although no attempt had been made then to
reword the floor amendment to incorporate the Court's language. The EschCummins change therefore can most reasonably be read as an effort to
match the legislative and judicial pronouncements in the communications
area and to extend administrative authority over communications to the full
reach of Congress' constitutional powers. By relating the statutory scheme
for communications regulation to the expansive early definition of federal
power over communications, the sixty-sixth Congress can be understood to
have shown in the initial stages of federal communications regulation that
the authority of regulatory agencies in the communications field was not to
be narrowly confined to existing technologies or operations but was to reach
as wide and deep as "progress" and "new developments" 56 carried it. In
interstate commerce act prior to Federal control. There was practically no demand for

was not
placing with added powers the wire systems under the commission. . . .[I]t
thought wise at this time to complicate the solution of the railroad question with the
peculiar problems connected with the regulation of wire systems.
H.R. REP. No. 456, supra note 49, at 11.
52. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.

53. The House" committee noted that by 1919 only "a half dozen cases" involving
communications had been brought before the ICC. H.R. REP. No. 456, supra note 49, at 11. See

text accompanying notes 82-84 infra.
54. 96 U.S. 1 (1877). The Court adopted a broad interpretation of the interstate commerce
clause in light of the changes wrought by the telegraph on postal service:
The powers thus granted [by the commerce clause and by the post office clause]

are not confined to the instrumentalities of commerce, or the postal service known or
in use when the Constitution was adopted, but they keep pace with the progress of the
country, and adapt themselves to the new developments of time and circumstances.

They extend from the horse with its rider to the stage-coach, from the sailing-vessel to
the steamboat, from the coach and the steamboat to the railroad, and from the railroad
to the telegraph, as these new agencies are successfully brought into use to meet the
demands of increasing population and wealth. They were intended for the government
of the business to which they relate, at all times and under all circumstances. As they
were entrusted to the general government for the good of the nation, it is not only the
right, but the duty, of Congress to see to it that intercourse among the States and the
transmission of intelligence are not obstructed or unnecessarily encumbered by State
legislation.
rd. at 9 (emphasis added).
55. 45 CONG. REC. 5537 (1910) (remarks of Rep. Cooper).

56. Pensacola Telephone, 96 U.S. at 9.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1978:1

this respect, the Esch-Cummins Act was of seminal importance in the
evolution of communications regulation, even though it, like the MannElkins Act ten years earlier, was passed with little or no consideration of the
special aspects of the field.
3. The Willis-Graham Act. In 1921, Congress expanded federal
authority over telecommunications by giving the ICC power to approve or
disapprove consolidations and mergers of telephone and telegraph
companies. At the same time, it exempted communications companies from
the restraints of the antitrust acts once the ICC had determined that a
proposed consolidation or merger would be "of advantage to the persons to
whom service is to be rendered and in the public interest." 57 This reallocation of federal authority from the courts to the ICC, known as the WillisGraham Act, was the first piece of legislation specifically targeted to the
new and increasingly complex problems of telecommunications in the twentieth century and was the first detailed congressional consideration of the
communications industry. It therefore takes on special importance in the
legislative history of communications regulation.
The Esch-Cummins Act had authorized the ICC to exempt railroads
from the antimerger laws upon a showing that consolidation of competing
rail lines would be in the public interest, but because of general reluctance to
alter the scheme of regulation that had been established through the MannElkins Act it had withheld power to exempt acquisitions of communications
companies. 58 As of 1921, therefore, communications carriers remained
statutorily subject to antitrust suits. The Justice Department had come close
to bringing one such suit during the crest of the period of intense competition between AT&T and the independent telephone companies, the process
ending in the formulation of an agreement between AT&T Vice-President
Nathan Kingsbury and Attorney General MacReynolds which required Bell
to divest control of Western Union,5 9 to interconnect independent lines with
its own long-distance lines 6° and to refrain from purchasing or acquiring
control of independent telephone companies operating in the same market as
Bell system subsidiaries. Under the agreement, known as the Kingsbury
Commitment, 61 AT&T remained free to purchase non-competing indepen57. Act of June 10, 1921 (Willis-Graham Act), Pub. L. No. 15, ch. 20, § 1, 42 Stat. 27 (1921)

(amending Transportation (Esch-Cummins) Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 152, ch. 91, § 407,41 Stat.
482) (repealed 1934)).
58. See notes 50-51 supra.
59. Bell had acquired control of Western Union in 1909. See J. BROOKS, TELEPHONE 133-34
(1975).
60. During the early competitive era, Bell had aggressively used the leverage it gained from

refusal to make long distance lines available to independents to force the competition out of
business. The independents had attempted to establish a competitor long-distance system in
1899, but the financing for it failed. See Gabel, supra note 15, at 350, 353.
61. Letter of N.C. Kingsbury, Vice-President of AT&T, to Attorney General J.C. Rey-
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dent companies, and it did so in the period between the 1913 agreement and
1921, increasing its control from about fifty percent of telephones in service
in 1910 to sixty-two percent in 1921.62 However, as the decade of the 1910s
evolved, independent companies who could not sell out to AT&T because of
the Kingsbury Commitment or to competitors because of antitrust prohibitions suffered progressively worsening financial problems and began to seek
relief from federal restrictions on consolidations. This effort culminated in
the passage of the Willis-Graham Act, which provided an escape route from
antitrust laws for financially pressed telephone companies 63 through the
64
ICC.
Unlike the Mann-Elkins and Esch-Cummins Acts, the Willis-Graham
Act underwent some measure of deliberate congressional consideration.
Joint hearings were held and the proposal received careful debate in the
House. 65 It therefore contains the first indications of federal policy toward
the communications market, and if Congress was not exactly clear on what
the dimensions of that policy were, it is nevertheless true that the legislators
expressed at least a "mood ' 6 6 about what federal regulation of telecommunications was to involve. Since the provisions of the Willis-Graham Act
were carried forward unchanged in the Communications Act of 1934 and
nolds, reprintedat FCC, REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION OF THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY IN THE
UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 340, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 139-41 (1939).
62. See J. Sichter, supra note 17, at 25 n.42.
63. The two telegraph carriers established at the time of the Willis-Graham Act, Western
Union and Postal Telegraph, were carefully excluded from the exemption provided for telephone carriers by the Act. It was not until 1943 that congressional authorization for a telegraph
merger was granted. Act of Mar. 6, 1943, Pub. L. No. 4, ch. 10, 57 Stat. 5 (codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 222 (1970)).
64. As far as the official records are concerned, at least, it appears that the primary push
for the Willis-Graham Act came from the independent telephone companies. See 61 CONG. REC.
1983 (1921) (remarks of Rep. Winslow) ("The bill was brought to the attention of the committee
by those representing a very large majority of the so-called independent telephone companies
.... Many of them are . . . skating on very thin ice"); Consolidation of Competing Telephone Companies:Joint Hearingson S. 1313 Before House and Senate Committees on Interstate
Commerce, 67th Cong., IstSess. 9-11 (1921) (testimony of F.B. MacKinnon). AT&T maintained a studied neutrality on the bill. See id. 21 (testimony of C. Cole on behalf of AT&T)("We
have no objection to the bill whatsoever. We are not proponents of the bill; we are not here
advocating it"). Whether this reflected AT&T's off-the-record position is, of course, subject to
some skepticism.
65. See Consolidation of Competing Telephone Companies: Joint Hearings on S. 1313
Before House and Senate Committees on Interstate Commerce, supra note 64; 61 CONG. REC.
1983-94 (1921). However, the committee reports are only two and three pages long and there
was no Senate debate at all. S. REP. No. 75, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921); H.R. REP. No. 109,
67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921); 61 CONG. REC. 1999 (1921) (Senate voice vote).
66. Cf. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474,487 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.) ("It is
fair to say that in all this Congress expressed a mood. . . .As legislation that mood must be
respected, even though it can only serve as a standard for judgment and not as a body of rigid
rules assuring sameness of application").
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remain in force today as 47 U.S.C. § 221(a), it is particularly important to
determine what that policy or "mood" was.
By 1921, the view was quite commonly expressed that telephone
service fitted the definition of a natural monopoly and should be regulated
and free from competition. The Senate Commerce Committee's flat declaration that "[t]elephoning is a natural monopoly" 67 was representative of this
sentiment, as were frequent comments to that effect in the Willis-Graham
debates. 68 That this view of the economic characteristics of telephone
service was at the root of the policy enacted by the Willis-Graham Act is not
subject to dispute. However, there are indications in the record of possible
limits to the range of this policy, and these limits are central to establishing
just how far the federal policy of natural monopoly reaches into the
communications market.
The central practical problem facing the committees that drafted the
Willis-Graham Act was the existence of dual and competing telephone
systems serving individual local markets. As the House committee explained:
Wherever there are such dual systems engaged in local business patrons of these telephone systems are put to endless annoyance and
increased expense. In order to reach all the people using telephones,
the telephone patron finds he must install two telephones in his house
and office. This entails additional expense and usually results in inferior service over both systems.69
Although the Committee found "[t]here is nothing to be gained by local
competition in the telephone business," it noted that "in about 1000 out of
the 21,000 exchange points in the United States there are two local exchanges.,"70 In the House debates, Representative Graham, the chief House
proponent of the bill, elaborated:
It is believed to be better policy to have one telephone system in a
community that serves all the people . . . . There is nothing more
exasperating, nothing that annoys the ordinary person more than to
have two competing local telephone systems, so that he must have in
his house and in his office two telephones . ... 7
67. S. REP. No. 75, supra note 65, at 1.
68. See, e.g., 61 CONG. REC. 1988 (1921) (remarks of Rep. Huddleston) ("Any man of
observation is bound to recognize that there are certain natural monopolies . . . . There are

monopolies which ought to exist in the interest of economy and good service in the public
welfare .

. .

. The telephone business is one of these"); id. 1991 (remarks of Rep. Burton)

("They are natural monopolies. It is desirable that one consolidated organization should occupy
one field").
69. H.R. REP. No. 190, 67th Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1921). The Senate reached a similar

conclusion. S. REP. No. 75, supra note 65, at 1. For a contemporary echoing of this twotelephone dilemma as a paradigm of natural monopoly, see 2 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF
REGULATION 123 (1970).

70. H.R. REP. No. 190, supra note 69, at 1.
71.

61 CONG. REC. 1983 (1921) (emphasis added). See text at note 178 infra.
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From these references in the record it appears most likely that the sixtyseventh Congress intended to create an explicit, promonopoly federal policy
toward basic telephone service insofar as individual local communications
markets were concerned. By clearing away the barriers to consolidation of
competing systems, the Willis-Graham Act announced a recognition that the
provision of telephone service facilities within a single exchange area was a
natural monopoly which should be protected from the deleterious effects of
competition. 72 The principal policy underlying the Act was that there should
be available in each community one system through which all telephone
users in that community can communicate. This does not automatically
mean that where such universal and unified facilities are available, competition with regard to other telecommunications services cannot coexist
compatibly with the local monopoly. But it does mean that what is familiarly thought of as local telephone service-the provision of facilities to route
calls within an exchange area through lines radiating from switching stations-is to be preserved from competition.
That the local service monopoly should be the focus of the policy
recognized by Congress in 1921 is of course no surprise. Telephone service
at that time consisted almost exclusively of local exchanges. After the
Kingsbury Commitment, AT&T's long-distance voice lines were interconnected with the independent local exchanges. Thus, it was the problem of
unprofitable duplicative local services that drove the independents to seek
refuge from the laws mandating competition. It also is not surprising,
therefore, that long-distance service is hardly mentioned in the WillisGraham record, 73 since no independent long-distance lines had ever
competed successfully with AT&T's long lines. 74 Operating under a
common and widely-held view of what the "telephone" was, and without
reason to anticipate the sophisticated technology that would develop from
the basic telephone apparatus, Congress was under no compulsion to elabo72. On its face, the policy of Willis-Graham did not necessarily go so far. In the first place,
the Act merely removed federal antitrust prohibitions against consolidations, and state public
utility commissions were left with full authority to decide whether proposed consolidations
were desirable. As a practical matter, though, it is apparent that state regulators were eager to
consolidate if freed from antitrust restrictions. See Consolidation of Competing Telephone
Companies: Joint Hearings on S. 1313 Before House and Senate Comm's on Interstate
Commerce, supra note 64, at 32 (testimony of J. Benton for NARUC). Moreover, the ICC was

allowed some measure of discretion in deciding which consolidations were deserving of exemptions. Although the language was changed by the committee from a simple authorization of a
discretionary ICC grant to a mandatory certification of exemption once the "advantage to
users" and "public interest" showings were made, see 61 CONG. REC. 1938 (1921) (committee
amendments), the leeway inherent in those standards indicates that some possibility of dual
systems remained where consolidation would not meet the "advantage" and "public interest"

tests.
73. The House Report refers to long distance services only once in passing. See text
accompanying note 76 infra.

74. See note 60 supra.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1978:1

rate on what the perimeters of the federal policy regarding the local telephone service were to be. Those perimeters were, no doubt, readily apparent
to all in 1921.
Nevertheless, it is impossible to conclude with assurance that the
Willis-Graham telecommunications policy was limited solely to local
competition in the provision of telephone facilities. The language of the Act
itself contains no such limitation; 75 and the House report refers to the
problem in passing as one of "dual and competing telephone systems, doing
both local and long-distance business.' '76 Moreover, within a year after its
passage the Act was applied by the ICC to permit consolidation of longdistance competitors, apparently without objections from the opponents of
the consolidation," thus reinforcing the applicability of the Act's antitrust
immunities beyond mergers of local competitors. Thus, while it is probable
that Willis-Graham enunciated a monopoly-oriented tilt where local duplication of facilities was involved, the Act's more general policy implications
remain too indistinct to provide meaningful guidance in cases which involve
potentially duplicative private service systems or ones in which alternate
suppliers compete for the responsibility of providing individual components
of the unified service facility.
B.

The Communications Act of 1934.

1. Development of the Communications Act. As demonstrated
above, the Mann-Elkins, Esch-Cummins and Willis-Graham Acts were
broad brush attempts to delineate a national policy with respect to the market
structure and regulation of telecommunications. With Mann-Elkins and
Esch-Cummins, Congress poured communications into the mold that had
developed from, and continued to be concerned primarily with, transportation services. When faced with the problems of duplicative local exchanges,
Congress turned special attention to communications carriers for the first
time; nonetheless, the resulting Willis-Graham antitrust exemption again
borrowed from existing transportation regulation, simply mirroring the
exemption that previously had been allowed for railroads. The sum of these
acts was a federal communications policy that went little further than the
generalized assertion that telephone and telegraph carriers should be regulated and that geographically competing providers of basic mouth-to-ear
telephone service should be free to consolidate. How the established regulatory authority was to operate was left to be analogized from railroad
regulation, without congressional guidance as to its goals.
The post-1921 statutory scheme for communication common carriage
75. See note 57 supra.

76. H.R. REP. No. 109, supra note 65, at 1.
77. Acquisition of Control of Northwestern Long Distance Tel. Co., 71 I.C.C. 530 (1922).
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regulation lacked not only an articulation of the aims which were to animate
the regulators, but to a large degree it lacked a regulatory authority as well.
In the first place, their usual railroad responsibilities kept the Interstate
Commerce Commissioners overworked during this period, and the EschCummins additions of new powers over railroads and water transportation
service compounded the workload. But more important, even if the ICC had
the time and personnel to devote to communications matters, the authority
granted it over telephone and telegraph was, for the most part, illusory. The
ICC was not empowered to initiate actions against telephone and telegraph
companies on its own; a complaint from a disgruntled competitor or
consumer of communications services was required before proceeding.
While in the transportation area complaints were easily generated by the
large amounts of money involved in challenges to railroad rates or practices,
in the communications area few users had interests substantial enough to
justify pursuing formal complaint proceedings. 7 8 The Commission could not
require communications carriers to file rate schedules as it was authorized to
require of railroad carriers. 7 9 It had no power to prescribe new rate schedules
to replace rates found unjust or unreasonable, and it had no authority to
require a certificate as a prerequisite to the expansion of communications
facilities. In fact, the authority of the Commission to regulate any type of
practice or classification beyond simple rates was in doubt.80 The power to
regulate communications granted the ICC by the legislation of 1910, 1920
and 1921 was "largely a paper authority."" 1
With no real policy to guide it, and no real powers to act through, the
ICC exercised its jurisdiction over telephone and telegraph infrequently and
82
with no enthusiasm. Only fourteen formal rate investigations were begun
and, with the exception of the introduction of a uniform accounting practice
in the industry, 8 3 ICC regulation between 1910 and 1934 had no lasting
impact on communications services, except insofar as it permitted unregulated private market forces to act without restraint. As one review of the
78. Wheat, The Regulation of Interstate Telephone Rates, 51 HARV. L. Rev. 846, 847
(1938); Note, supra note 42, at 632.
79. During this period, the ICC "repeatedly urged the modification of the statute so as to
require the wire carriers to file rate schedules." Note, supra note 42, at 632 n.26.
80. See 60 CONG. REC. 8528 (1920) (colloquy between Reps. Esch and White during debate
on Esch-Cummins bill).
81. Note, supra note 42, at 632.
82. Eight of the cases involved telegraph rates; four, telephone rates; and two, cable rates.
See J. HERRING & G. CROSS, TELECOMMUNICATIONS 220 (1936). The ICC undertook some
consideration of telephone depreciation charges and valuation of Western Union properties,
but both investigations failed to reach a final stage before jurisdiction passed to the FCC in
1934. See Note, supra note 42, at 632-33.
83. Interstate Commerce Commission, ANNUAL REPORT (1913). The rules, revised and
upheld by the Supreme Court in 1936, AT&T v. United States, 299 U.S. 232 (1936), remain in
effect today. See 47 U.S.C. § 220(a) (1970).
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period put it, "[t]he net result of regulation under the ICC may well have
been to relieve the wire carriers of any effective governmental control in the
84
public interest."
Awareness of this regulatory deficiency was first reflected on Capitol
Hill in 1929, when legislation was introduced to consolidate federal authority over communications in one agency. The proposed legislation distributed
communications jurisdiction among the ICC, which had telephone and
telegraph authority, the Federal Radio Commission, which had control over
the newer technology of broadcasting, 85 and the Postmaster General, who
had long-standing authority over telegraph operations. 86 Hearings were held
in the Senate to investigate the relocation of these split jurisdictions under
one authority.8 7 However, no final action was taken on the bill.
During the first year of the Roosevelt administration, the idea of a
unified communications agency was rejuvenated in studies of national
communications policy by both the adminstration 88 and Congress.8 9 In
February 1934, President Roosevelt proposed the creation of a Federal
Communications Commission in which the existing authority of the Federal
Radio Commission, the ICC and the Postmaster General would be consolidated. 90 This recommendation was echoed by the conclusions of the massive congressional study of the communications industry headed by Dr.
William Splawn. 9 1The day after Roosevelt's message, legislation designed
to achieve the goal of consolidation was introduced, 92 and the drafting of
what became the Communications Act of 1934 began.
84. Note, supra note 42, at 633.
85. Authority over radio had originally been vested in the Department of Commerce in
1912, and was later relocated under the Federal Radio Commission, created by the Radio Act of
1927, Pub. L. No. 632, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (repealed 1934).
86. See, e.g., Act of July 24, 1866, ch. 230, 14 Stat. 221 (fostering construction of telegraph
lines by providing rights-of-way over public lands).
87. Hearings on S. 6 Before the Senate Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 71st Cong., Ist
Sess. (1929) (Couzens bill).
88.

INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMIITEE, 73D CONG., 2D SESS., STUDY OF COMMUNICATIONS,

(ROPER REPORT) (Sen. Comm. Print 1934).
89. PRELIMINARY REPORT ON COMMUNICATIONS COMPANIES (SPLAWN REPORT),
No. 1273, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
90. The text of President Roosevelt's message to Congress read in part:

H.R. REP.

I have long felt that for the sake of clarity and effectiveness the relationship of the
Federal Government to certain services known as "utilities" should be divided into
three fields: Transportation, power, and communications . ...
In the field of communications . . . there is today no single Government agency
charged with broad authority . ...
I recommend that Congress create a new agency to be known as the "Federal
Communications Commission", such agency to be vested with the authority now lying
in the Federal Radio Commission and with such authority over communications as
now lies with the Interstate Commerce Commission . . ..
Message to Congress, Feb. 26, 1934, reprintedin H.R. REP. No. 1850, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2
(1934).
91. SPLAWN REPORT, supra note 89, at xxix.
92. S. 2910, H.R. 8301, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (both introduced Feb. 27, 1934).
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As was the case with many of the early initiatives of the first Roosevelt
administration, the legislative process was swift. Senate hearings were
underway within three weeks, 93 the House hearing began a month later.94
Both reports were out by June 195 and debate was completed by the next
day; the work of the conference committee was then done and approved in a
week. 96 The whole process took just over 100 days. The speed with which
the bill was enacted has given some commentators alarm; 97 for a measure
that was to have such a fundamental impact on an industry as the Communications Act has had, more deliberation would seem to have been appropriate. 98 Moreover, the debate on the Act centered on broadcasting and almost
neglected wire carriers altogether. Nevertheless, the period from February
27 to June 9, 1934 represents the first and the last time that Congress as a
body has turned its attention to the full range of issues associated with the
regulation of the telecommunications industry. 99 It is, therefore, the sole
93. Hearings on S. 2910 Before the Senate Comm. on InterstateCommerce, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1934).
94. Hearings on H.R. 8301.
95. S. REP. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); H.R. REP. No. 1850, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1934).
96. H.R. REP. No. 1918, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) (Conference Report), reprintedin 78
CONG. REC. 10969 (1934).
97. The Dill bill [the original version of the Communications Act] was debated only briefly
in the Senate, the entire debate taking place on May 15, 1934. . . . The bill was then
passed without a roll call.
In the House, the debate was even briefer, being limited to only two hours on June
2, 1934. The shortness of the debate in both houses is striking, bearing in mind the
importance of the bill, which worked a complete transformation of the regulation df
communications.
IV B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 12, at 2375-76 (1973). The committee reports were nine and eleven
pages, respectively, most of which were given over to a simple recounting of the bill's
provisions. The debates were not only short, but highly partisan, with Republican allegations
that the Roosevelt administration-already making political use of radio through the fireside
chats-would use the FCC for partisan ends. See 78 CONG. REC. 10317 (1934) (remarks of Rep.
Fish). Almost no debate took place on the common carrier provisions of the new law.
98. It would be useful, however, to compare the extent of congressional consideration
given the Communications Act with comparable early New Deal legislation such as the National
Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and others. It may be that Congress gave no less attention to rewriting the communications
law than to other major federal regulatory statutes.
Note also that the short attention given to the Communications Act may be due to some
degree to a contemplation that more legislation on the subject would be enacted as a result of
the studies commissioned by the Act. See the discussion of section 215 at text accompanying
notes 204-10 infra. The studies produced no major revisions or expansions of the Act.
99. That this was the first full consideration is evident from the cursory or partial attention
given telecommunications in the Mann-Elkins, Esch-Cummins, and Willis-Graham Acts. That
this was the last full consideration is indicated by the fact that no major revisions of the
Communications Act have been accomplished since 1934. The principal amendments to the
wire communications authority of the act have been the addition of section 222, permitting the
Western Union-Postal Telegraph merger, see note 63 supra, and the requirement that carriers
obtain a certificate of convenience and necessity for abandonment of facilities as well as
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source of the law and policy which must govern federal administrative
regulation l°° of telecommunications. Whatever statutory restraints exist on
FCC policy-making, especially on its policies regarding competition in the
modern compunications markets, are to be found within the text of the Act
and the legislative record that accompanied its passage.
2. The Telecommunications Provisions of the Act. The Act itself
drew heavily on its predecessors, reflecting its origins in the amalgamation
of the separate existing federal authorities over portions of the communications markets. Title II of the Act incorporated the provisions of the Interstate
Commerce Act that had governed telephone and telegraph since 1910. Title
I adopted the substance of the Radio Act of 1927 governing broadcasting.
Titles IV-VI set forth general administrative procedures used in much of the
federal regulation in operation at the time. Only Title I, which announced
the creation of the FCC and stated broadly the purposes of the Act, was
more the product of the Communications Act's drafters than of the statutes
which previously governed communications regulation.
While it is true that the wire communications provisions of Title II were
carried over, basically intact, from the Interstate Commerce Act, some new
powers over common carriers were granted to the FCC that had not been
available to the ICC in regulating telecommunications. Section 201(a)
empowered the FCC to require carriers to interconnect with other carriers
and to establish through-routes.10 1 Section 201(b) resolved ambiguities over
whether ICC jurisdiction had extended beyond regulation of rates and
charges; the statute granted the FCC clear authority to review not only
carriers' charges, but also their "practices, classifications, and regulations," to determine whether they were just and reasonable. 102 Section 203
expansion, Pub. L. No. 4, ch. 10, § 2, 57 Stat. 11 (1943) (amending 47 U.S.C. § 214(a)). Other
amendments have been of a specialized or housekeeping sort, or concerned with specialized
areas of carriage by satellite. See Communications Satellite Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-624, 76
Stat. 419 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 701-744 (1970)) (illustrating the way modern communications
technologies raise problems which are reflected in the Title II common carrier scheme).

Congress may be in the process of undertaking a complete review of telecommunications
regulation in considering the Consumer Communications Reform Act and legislative
countermeasures. See note 10 supra.

100. It is worth remembering, of course, that telecommunications is also subject to federal
regulation under the antitrust laws. See AT&T v. United States, 427 F. Supp. 57 (D.D.C. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1071 (1977).
101. 47 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1970). This was adapted from section 1(4) of the Interstate
Commerce Act, which had applied only to transportation carriers. See Hearings on S. 2910
Before the Senate Comm. on Interstate Commerce, supra note 93, at 200. AT&T had been under
a nonstatutory duty to interconnect other carriers in most circumstances as a result of the
Kingsbury Commitment. See text accompanying notes 59-60 supra.
102. 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1970). This was adapted from section 1(6) of the Interstate
Commerce Act, which gave the ICC authority over practices, classifications and regulation of
transportation carriers only.
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made filing of rate schedules with the FCC mandatory for communications
carriers, a duty which had not been imposed under the Interstate Commerce
Act.10 3 Section 204 empowered the FCC to make use of these filings to
investigate proposed changes in rates not only after a user presented a
complaint but "upon its own initiative without complaint," and to suspend
the proposed rate schedule pending the investigation."14 Section 211 gave
the FCC authority to require the submission of contracts made by any
carrier. Section 214 made it a condition for the expansion or construction of
new interstate telecommunications lines that the carrier obtain a certificate
of public convenience and necessity from the Commission. 0" And section
218 instructed the FCC to keep abreast of technological developments in
telecommunications "to the end that the benefits of new inventions and
developments may be made available to the people of the United States." 106
The sum effect of these new provisions was to afford the newly-established
federal agency regulating communications carriers the same repertoire of
tools and powers used by the ICC in regulating transportation carriers.
In at least one respect, however, the Communications Act went well
beyond its precursor amendments to the Interstate Commerce Act. Title I
enunciated an overarching goal to which the Title H powers, together with
the Title I authority over broadcasting, were to be directed:
For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in
communication by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as
possible, to all the people of the United States a rapid, efficient, nationwide, and world-wide wire and radio communications service with
adequate facilities at reasonable charges, for the purpose of national
defense, and for the purpose of securing a more effective execution of
this policy by centralizing authority heretofore granted by law to several agencies and by granting additional authority with respect to interstate and foreign commerce in wire and radio communication ....
107
This statement of purpose was not derived from, or even foreshadowed by,
the 1910, 1920 or 1921 communications amendments to the Commerce Act
or the overall railroad regulation scheme to which the amendments were
appended. It is original to the Communications Act. As such it may play an
important role in determining the intent of the seventy-third Congress with
103. 47 U.S.C. § 203 (1970). Compare section 6 of the Interstate Commerce Act (filing
required for transportation carriers only).
104. 47 U.S.C. § 204 (1970). This reflected powers the ICC had over railroads through
section 15(7) of the Interstate Commerce Act. See text accompanying note 79 supra.
105. 47 U.S.C. § 214 (1970). This was based on sections 1(18)-(22) of the Interstate
Commerce Act, requiring such certificates for expansion of rail carrier lines.
106. 47 U.S.C. § 218 (1970). No such duty had been imposed on the ICC during its tenure
over telephone and telegraph.
107. Communications Act of 1934, § 1, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1970). See text accompanying notes
164-203 infra.
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respect to national telecommunications policy; the established carriers have
made recourse to it as a building block in the argument that FCC discretion
to permit telecommunications competition is circumscribed by congressional endorsement of a monopolistic market structure.108 This novel view of the
Act is explored in Part IV below. But for the most part, this statement of
purposes has been ignored by courts and regulators who, in the process of
discerning statutory policy toward telecommunications competition, have
read the Act to grant the FCC an almost plenary authority over the structure
of American telecommuncations. 1°9 It is this more orthodox view of
Communications Act policy which will be examined in Part III.
II. THE ORTHODOX VIEW: CREATION OF A NEW REGULATOR
From the record, it is quite clear that one purpose of the seventy-third
Congress in passing the Communications Act of 1934 was to centralize
authority over telecommunications in one federal regulatory body. The
ICC's regulation of telephone and telegraph had resulted in essentially no
regulation at all, while the burgeoning radio industry had been subject first
to the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Commerce, then of the Radio Commission. By 1934, an awareness was surfacing that the separate technologies of
telephone, telegraph, and radio played complementary roles in the larger
network of what had come to be called the "communications industry."
Along with that awareness grew the idea that a unified, coordinated system
of regulation for communications was needed. President Roosevelt's message to Congress accompanying the administration proposal for the
Communications Act stressed the need for a "single Government agency
charged with broad authority." 11 0 The point was repeated by almost every
witness at the hearings on the Act and in both committee reports. That the
establishment of this "single agency" was foremost in the minds of the
Communications Act's authors and proponents is abundantly clear.
The difficult question is whether Congress intended to accomplish
anything beyond centralization in passing the Communications Act. Was the
entire purpose of the Act to relocate the disparate authorities of the ICC, the
Radio Commission and the Postmaster General in a single body, yet not
alter the law which that body was to apply and the policy by which it was to
be guided? Or did the Act work not only a restructuring of the regulatory
process for telecommunications and other communications areas but also a
new or expanded law and policy relating to telecommunications technologies?
108. See text accompanying notes 149-250 infra.
109. See text accompanying notes 110-148 infra.
110. Message to Congress, supra note 90, at 1.
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The Legislative History.

There is strong support in the legislative history for the view that the
Act's objectives were limited. In the first place, the two studies which led to
the drafting of the Communications Act recommended only restructuring of
the regulatory jurisdictions. The Roper Report,"' the Roosevelt administration's first report on communications problems, suggested only a centralization of authority. The President's message to Congress proposing the
Communications Act followed this view by emphasizing the organizational
problems of communications regulation and urging only the "transferring
[of] the present authority" without altering it. 112 The Splawn Report on
communications holding companies prepared for the Commerce Committees-the report that provided the factual basis on which the seventy-third
Congress acted-proposed a bill which
would accomplish three purposes: (a) A codification of existing Federal
legislation regulating communications; (b) a transfer of jurisdictions
from several departments, boards, and commissions to a new
communications commission; and (c) a postponement for future action
after further study and113observation of some of the more difficult and
controversial subjects.
In neither report was change in the substance of regulation thought necessary.
Both congressional committees reporting the Communications Act
indicated the same view. The House Commerce Committee explained that
it is the primary purpose of this bill [the Communications Act] to create
such a commission [with comprehensive jurisdiction] armed with adequate statutory authority to regulate all forms of communication ....
The bill is largely based upon existing legislation and except for the
change of administrative authority does not very greatly change or add
114
to existing law .
Committee Chairman (and later Speaker of the House) Rayburn told his
colleagues during the debate that "the bill as a whole does not change
existing law, not only with reference to radio but with reference to telegraph, telephone, and cable, except in the transfer of the jurisdiction and
such minor amendments as to make that transfer effective." 1 15 The Commit111. THE ROPER REPORT, supra note 88.
112. Message to Congress, supra note 90, at 2.
113. SPLAWN REPORT, supra note 89, at xxix.
114. H.R. REP. No. 1850, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934).
115. 78 CoNG. REc. 10313 (1934) (remarks of Rep. Rayburn). See id. 10315 (colloquy
between Reps. Rayburn and Snell):
No change in the present law?
Mr. Snell:
Mr. Rayburn: We transfer the jurisdiction to the new commission, and the only
amendment as to the telegraph and telephone companies is to make
effective their transfer.
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tee emphasized that the "minor amendments" to which Chairman Rayburn
referred, meaning the addition of the several regulatory powers which had
been unavailable to the ICC under the Mann-Elkins and Esch-Cummins
Acts, 116 were not intended to signal any new direction in communications
policy. Rather, the amendments were designed to provide the FCC with
statutory powers comparable to those customarily employed in transportation regulation. As the committee report explained:
[T]he [Commerce] act never has been perfected to encompass adequate
regulation of communications, but has really been an adaptation of
railroad regulation to the communications field. As a consequence,
there are many inconsistencies in the terms of the act and also many
important gaps which hinder effective regulation. In this bill the attempt has been made to preserve the value of court and commission
interpretation of that act, but at the same time modifying the provisions
so as to provide adequately
for the regulation of communications
7
common carriers."
According to the committee, the Title II communications common carrier
provisions "[f]or the most part . . . [follow] provisions of the Interstate
Commerce Act now applicable to communications or [adapt] some provisions of that act now applicable only to transportation.""18 Thus, the House
expressed a firm intent to maintain the continuity of the fundamental
substantive law of communications regulation, embryonic as the substantive
law may have been. The House also described the expanded authority under
Title II as an attempt to make the existing regulatory scheme effective under
the new regulators by correcting omissions and oversights resulting from the
hasty and incomplete consideration given the 1910 and 1920 legislation.
The Senate Commerce Committee's conception of the bill paralleled
that of the House. Noting that much of the language of the legislation was
copied verbatim from the Commerce Act, the Committee explained that
where the provisions varied from the text of the Commerce Act it was "for
the purpose of clarification in their application to communications, rather
than as a manifestation of congressional intent to attain a different objective. "119 Title II, in the Senate Committee's view, "follow[ed] provisions
of the Interstate Commerce Act now applicable to communications or
adapt[ed] some provisions of that act now applicable only to transportation." 120 On the Senate floor, Chairman Dill called attention to the fact that
nearly three-quarters of the bill "comprise[d] a rewriting of existing radio
law and its amendments and of the Interstate Commerce Act and its amend116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

See text accompanying notes 101-06 supra.
H.R. REP. No. 1850, supra note 114, at 4.
Id.5.
S.REP. No. 781, supra note 95, at 2.
Id.3.
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ments," while the remainder provided "for certain additional powers which
the committee thought were necessary for the newly created commission to
have for effective regulation." 121 As the committee report made clear, these
new powers were not thought to express any new policy other than that
regulation of communications and telecommunications 22 was to become
more effective than had been the case to date. 123
The view that Congress intended no major substantive change in the
law governing telecommunications is reinforced by the actions Congress did
take in 1934 regarding possible changes in the federal policy toward the
communications industry. As noted earlier, President Roosevelt in his
message proposing the Communications Act requested only a reorganization
of regulatory jurisdictions. Rather than ask for reorientation of communications policy, Roosevelt suggested that the new FCC be given "full power to
investigate and study the business of existing [communications] companies
24
and make recommendations to the Congress for additional legislation."1
The Splawn report had urged the same course. 12 Congress followed these
suggestions by requiring the new FCC to "consider needed additional
legislation" in critical problem areas; the House Committee stated that
existing law was not greatly changed by the new act and that the "most
controversial questions [were] held in abeyance for a report by the new
commission recommending legislation for their solution." 126 This postponement, embodied in section 215 of the Act, 127 explicitly shifted primary
responsibility for a large part of the development of federal common carrier
121. 78 CONG. REC. 8822 (1934) (remarks of Sen. Dill); cf. id. 4139 (remarks of Senator Dill

on introducing S. 3285) ("The purpose of the proposed legislation is to make effective the
power now written into the Interstate Commerce Act to control the telephone and telegraph

business in this country").
122. It was noted that regulation of telecommunications had been "practically nil." S. REP.
No. 781, supra note 95, at 2.

123. When the conference report returned to the House and Senate there was little discussion. Representative Mayes, one of the House conferees, emphasized the continuity of the

substantive communications law, remarking that the bill "left existing law intact but established
a new communications commission." 78 CONG. REc. 10990 (1934). Some members objected to

the speed with which the bill was moved through Congress, concluding that no time had been
provided for mature reflection on it. See id. 10988, 10989 (remarks of Reps. Bland and
Lehlbach).
124. Message to Congress, supra note 90, at 2.
125. See SPLAWN REPORT, supra note 89 ("postponement for future action after further

study and observation of some of the more difficult and controversial subjects").
126. H.R. REP. No. 1850, supra note 95, at 3.
127. 47 U.S.C. § 215 (1970). Congress directed the FCC to investigate and submit legislation
if necessary on intercompany transactions and relationships between holding companies and
operating subsidiaries, on the provision of telegraph service by telephone companies and viceversa, and on exclusive contracts prohibiting patrons of a carrier from doing business with
other carriers. See 78 CONG. REC. 10314 (1934) (Rep. Rayburn's explanation of section 215). On
Bell's brief venture into the telegraph business through its purchase of the Teletype Corporation, see Trebing, Common CarrierRegulation: The Silent Crisis, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROn.
299, 306 (1969).
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telecommunications policy to the new agency. Henceforth it was to be the
FCC's task, not Congress', to take the first step in suggesting changes in the
law governing telecommunications. Ultimate authority, of course, was to
remain with the legislators; the Commission was to study and then suggest
new legislation on which Congress would have to act before federal policy
and law could take new shape. With respect to the meaning of the
Communications Act itself, the very fact that Congress delegated to the FCC
the task of formulating new legislation dealing with telecommunications
supports the conclusion that Congress intended to do no more than streamline the regulatory system as inherited from Mann-Elkins and Esch-Cummins. New law and new policy were left for a later date. 128
B.

The Policy of the Act.
In light of Congress' apparent intention that the Communications Act
alter only the form of regulation in force in 1934, and thus that it carry
forward intact the regulatory policy established by its predecessor statutes, it
becomes particularly important to determine as best possible the content of
the substantive law of the Mann-Elkins, Esch-Cummins, and Willis-Graham
Acts as well as the Communications Act itself. However, as Paul Berman
has written, "examination of the legislative history of telephone and telegraph regulation yields no clearer indication of just [what] . . . was in the
mind of Congress."' 129 Yet while it is impossible to measure with any
certainty the cumulative effect on this area of the attention that Congress
briefly turned toward the communications industry in 1910, 1920, 1921 and
1934, it is possible to suggest some of the dimensions of the telecommunications policy on monopoly and competition which are embedded within the
statute.
Some evidence of the roots of Communications Act policy is visible in
the congressional consideration of the Act itself. There is no doubt, for
example, that the legislators in 1934 recognized as they had in 1921130 the
existence of AT&T's telephone monopoly. 3 ' But, again as in 1921, at no
128. The contemporary commentary on the Communications Act also reinforces this
conclusion. One observer complained that
it appears on analysis that the administration has no program or policy at all, except to
consolidate communications control, and that it has not and apparently will not come
to grips with the really vital questions which must all be solved before the country has
a sound communications policy.
Webster, Notes on the Policy of the Administration with Reference to the Control of Communications, 5 AIR LAw REV. 107, 107-08 (1934). See also Note, The CommunicationsAct of 1934, 5
AIR LAW REV. 299 (1934).

129. Berman, Computer or Communications?Allocation of Functions and the Role of the
FederalCommunications Commission, 27 FED. COM. B.J. 161, 215 (1974) (examining whether
so-called packet communications fit the Communications Act definition of "common carrier"
and "wire carrier").
130. See text accompanying notes 67-68 supra.
131. See S. REP. No. 781, supra note 95, at 2 ("this vast monopoly which so immediately
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point during the congressional debates or in the brief committee reports was
the scope of that monopoly discussed. None of the legislators responsible
for the Communications Act so much as indicated a view on whether
"monopoly" in this instance encompassed only the operation of basic trunk
and switching centers in local, geographically compact areas or extended to
all methods of voice communication by wire; nor did they indicate whether
"monopoly" included manufacture and sale as well as maintenance of the
equipment through which that communication was accomplished.
Of course the standard response to this observation is that Congress
was not more articulate because in 1934 the meaning of "the telephone
monopoly" was generally known. Since no one needed an explanation, no
explanation was given. To an extent, this response is accurate; there was
apparently a consensus about certain aspects of "the telephone monopoly." 13 2 But there was also clear disagreement about how far the scope of the
monopoly should be permitted to reach, and about how great a role competition should play. The hearings on the Communications Act aptly illustrate
this disagreement. At one extreme, David Sarnoff, influential through his
control of the National Broadcasting Company radio network at the time,
133
advocated the complete abandonment of competition in communications.
AT&T emphasized the widespread acknowledgment by state regulators
"that the telephone is a monopoly and competition against the public
interest." 134 On the other hand, the independent telephone companies vigorously denied that all forms of competition in telecommunications were
wasteful. 135 In fact, they insisted that telephone service improved only under
the mutual prodding of competitors. Since it would be safe to say that both
136
AT&T and the independents had some influence in Congress at the time,
it cannot be assumed that either pole of the debate evidenced by the hearings
represented the dominant view of the period. To the contrary, it should be
clear that the bromidic assertion that "telephone is a monopoly" meant
different things to different interests; the national policy concerning monopoly and competition in the telecommunications industry was not intuitively
known by all.
Neither was it clear, for that matter, what kinds of "competition" were
serves the needs of the people in their daily and social life must be effectively regulated"); 78

CONG.
132.
133.
134.

REc. 10315 (1934) (remarks of Rep. Rayburn).
See text accompanying notes 69-72 supra & note 137 infra.
Address by David Sarnoff, printed at 78 CONG. REC. 5209 (1934).
Hearings on H.R. 8301 at 200 (testimony of W. Gifford on behalf of AT&T).

135. "To these people [who advocated the Bell argument for monopoly] the wastes of

competition seem as obvious as the flatness of the earth. You need only to look at it to see that
it is flat." Id. 267 (testimony of D. Friday on behalf of the independent telephone companies).
136. There were over 6000 independents serving 14,000 communities at the time of the
passage of the Act. Id. 200 (testimony of W. Gifford). It may be inferred from these statistics
that the independents' voice was not ignored in Congress.
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envisioned. The independents' witnesses emphasized the benefits of two
competitive practices: the yardstick for measuring the comparative performances provided by the limited competition between adjacent but not overlapping local service monopolies which were not engaged in direct competition
for revenues, and the technological innovations that resulted from competitive manufacture and procurement. But other potential sources of telephone
competition were not mentioned during the congressional consideration of
the Act.
Although the historical evidence indicates no general contemporary
"sense" of a telecommunications market structure envisioned by the
Communications Act, there was one area where a broad contemporary
agreement favoring monopoly did exist during the period in which the Act
was passed. It was conceded that routine local telephone service-the
routing and switching of calls within a geographic area-required a monopoly. Even the independents, who had local basic-service monopolies of
their own, found competition in this area indefensible. 137 This was little
more than a continuation of the basic concern that had first surfaced in the
Willis-Graham Act. It remained the only limit on telecommunications market structure with firm support in the enacting record, as it had been in
1921.138
With the exception of this support for a local service monopoly, it can
be argued convincingly that in the formulation of telecommunications regulation between 1910 and 1934 Congress failed to agree on any substantive
policy. This lack of agreement does not imply, however, that from 1910 to
1934 there was no telecommunications policy at all. Although Congress did
not endorse any particular structure for the telecommunications market
beyond the local geographic monopoly, it did make clear that the nature of
the market structure was to be left to public, not private, decisionmaking.
Although procedural rather than substantive in emphasis, this clarification
was no less a policy than a flat promonopoly or procompetition policy would
have been. The unifying theme throughout the congressional considerations
of telephone and telegraph policy from Mann-Elkins to the Communications
Act is that the allocation of authority over the interstate telecommunications
market should reside finally in a public regulatory body. The Communications Act was adopted largely in response to the failure of the Mann-Elkins,
Esch-Cummins and Willis-Graham Acts to realize this goal.
137. "One kind of competition was, indeed, eliminated [in the period prior to 1934]. The
experience of previous years had shown that two telephone systems in the same community are

neither economical nor convenient." Id. 269 (statement of D. Friday, on behalf of the independent telephone companies); cf. Hearings on S. 2910 Before the Senate Comm. on Interstate
Commerce, supra note 93, at 100 (testimony of W. Gifford on behalf of AT&T) ("They
[telephone companies] are a monopoly in the particular place they are in").
138. See text accompanying notes 69-72 supra.
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The ICC's inability or unwillingness to carry out its responsibilities in
this area resulted in the creation of a public decisionmaker with clear and
unified authority over communications. 139 Moreover, in overseeing the
telecommunications market structure, the new regulator was to have teeth,
as indicated by the grant of expanded regulatory tools in the Communications Act.140 The new regulator was to operate under the broadest charter
imaginable-a standard of public interest, convenience and necessity. Its
power apparently was as extensive as that of the federal government under
the commerce clause of the Constitution. 141 It was to view the market openendedly, with an eye out to new developments. 4 2 And above all, it was to
ensure that telecommunications "be effectively regulated." 4 3 Whatever
that mandate implied for the structure of the market, the determination was
to rest with the Commission and not with the private players.
The adoption in 1934 of this essentially procedural policy is not
startling. As has frequently been said, the legislators did not anticipate the
development of sophisticated microwave or data processing technologies or
of specialized communications needs that would require a multiplicity of
services and equipment. But as the debate 144 and the Act itself' 45 indicate,
Congress was aware that the communications market was in a process of
evolution. Although there is little doubt that, given the historical period in
which Congress acted, the creative force b'ehind this evolution was to come
from private actors, the task of directing that evolution was made a public
one. 146 It was the establishment of a regulatory process capable of this task
of public regulation to which the Communications Act and its predecessors
were addressed. 147 The result of this policy was to commit the structure of
139. See text accompanying notes 82-84 supra.
140. See text accompanying notes 101-06 supra,

141. See text accompanying notes 54-56 supra.
142. Communications Act of 1934 § 218, 47 U.S.C. § 218 (1970), discussed in text accompanying note 106 supra.
143. S. REP. No. 781, supra note 95, at 2. See also 78 CONG. REC. 10313-15 (1934) (remarks
of Rep. Rayburn).
144. See remarks of Rep. Merritt, quoted at note 6 supra. See text accompanying notes 54-

56 supra, discussing PensacolaTelephone and the Esch-Cummins Act.
145. See text accompanying note 106 supra.
146. The contemporary commentary-what little of it there was-recognized this as a
central outcome of the Communications Act. See Note, The CommunicationsAct of 1934, 21
VA. L. REv. 318, 324-25 (1934):

The added powers vested in the Commission should prove of benefit to the public in
possible rate reductions and closer regulation of the carrier's activities for the public
good. The Act, however, should be equally helpful to the carriers. Though at present
there seems little chance of any true competition in the field, the same was thought
true in the field of transportation thirty years ago. With unified control, the interests of
the carriers may be better preserved should such competition arise in the future.
147. What Justice Holmes said of the Constitution can also be said of the Communications
Act: "[W]e must realize that they have called into a life a being the development of which could
not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to
realize or hope they had created an organism." Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
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the telecommunications market to political interaction before the Commission, subject to rather cursory substantive judicial review; the distribution of
opportunities during the evolution of telecommunications was left to a
political resolution without significant legislative limits on the outcome. 148
IV.
A.

"TRUE FAITH" Am mE 1934 MILIEU

The New Model.

Like most reformations, the FCC's procompetition policy has produced
a counterreformation 4 9 led by those whose positions have been most jeopardized by the new policy-the established carriers, whose revenues are at
stake, and the state regulatory agencies whose traditional jurisdiction has
been partially usurped by federal authorization of competitive entry and
interconnection. And as might be expected of a counterreformation, a
sizeable part of the assault on the FCC competition decisions has been
devoted to the articulation of a new model of the policy and theory underlying the chief document in question-in this case the telecommunications
50
provisions of the Communications Act.1
At the core of this new model is a vision its advocates describe as the
"true faith" 151 of the Act. The vision is a complex one, but its essential
features may be briefly summarized. In its most elementary form, the new
model suggests that the Communications Act provided not only for centralization of regulation, as the orthodox interpretation would have it, but for
the centralization of provision of telecommunications services and facilities
as well. The Act, it is claimed, recognizes a "national public utility
franchise. . . managed as a unified system by AT&T and its affiliates in
partnership with some 1600 Independent Telephone Companies" for the
purpose of "assur[ing] the maintenance and development of the telephone
network." 152 The telecommunications industry under this new model would
148. See K.
INDUSTRY

BORCHARDT,

STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE U.S.

COMMUNICATIONS

125-26 (1970):

The distribution of opportunities deals with the question "who gets what and how

..... " [C]onflicts over opportunity distributions remain essentially political conflicts
even though resolutions of such conflicts are delegated to executive departments or

independent regulatory commissions to be decided in accordance with such general
standards as "the public interest."
See also Fuchs, The New Administrative State: JudicialSanction for Agency Self-Determination in the Regulation of Industry, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 219 (1969).
149. See Comment, supra note 3.
150. The assault has a second major front as well: the attempt to secure the replacement or
revision by Congress of the Act itself, rather than mere reinterpretation of it in the courts. See

note 10 supra. This study is primarily concerned with the effort via litigation to invest the 1934
Act with a new, more monopoly-oriented character, not with legislative reforms. However, the
outcome of the effort to interpret the existing statute has significant ramifications for the
current legislative debate. See text accompanying notes 251-52 infra.
151. The Great Telephone Debate 64-65.

152. See The Great TelephoneDebate 64. This article represents one of the most comprehensive statements of the new model.
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be structured as an expansive, integrated monopoly network under a single
management pervasively regulated by the FCC, and free of deleterious
competition. It would become the business of the FCC in this scheme to do
more than simply regulate efficiently; the Commissioners would be charged
with the affirmative duty to shape regulation toward an ultimate goal of
ensuring that the monopoly network not be jeopardized by potential telecommunications competitors. 153
According to its proponents, the consequence of this new model of the

law of telecommunications regulation is the emergence of four sub-principles designed to implement the overarching goal of protecting the franchised
monopoly network. First, the FCC may not permit the entry into the
industry of telecommunications services or facilities that operate outside the
network itself and that duplicate existing services without providing users

more than what is available from the unified, franchised network-the "no
duplicative competition" principle. 154 Second, the FCC may not permit the
offering of communications services or facilities from outside the network
which carry a risk of being technologically incompatible with the network
offerings- the "technical harm" principle. 155 Third, the FCC may not
153. See The Great Telephone Debate 65: "[T]he basic contention. . . [is] that the 1934 Act,
and common sense in any event, require the FCC to preserve, maintain, and use the resources
of the integrated telephone network where it is economic to do so, as an immensely valuable
national asset and the heart of our communications system." See notes 40 supra & 179 infra.
154. This focus on duplication of services is evident in AT&T's criticism of the Specialized
Common Carrier decisions, Establishment of Policies and Procedures for Consideration of
Applications to Provide Specialized Common Carrier Services in the Domestic Public Point-toPoint Microwave Radio Service, 29 F.C.C.2d 870, aff'd sub nom. Washington Util. & Transp.
Comm. v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1976); Bell Tel. Co. v.
FCC, 503 F.2d 1250 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1026 (1975). AT&T considers the
services provided by the specialized common carriers to be duplicative of basic long-distance
service and insists specialized common carriers are no more than "other" common carriers
which have no place in the scheme established by the Communications Act. See AT&T v. FCC,
539 F.2d 767 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Domestic Common CarrierRegulation: Hearings on H.R. 7047
Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, supra note 10 (statement of Eugene V. Rostow on behalf of AT&T).
155. The "technical harm" threat has been advanced primarily by AT&T in challenging the
interconnnection decisions following Carterfone. Problems of technical interface and design
may expose the network to deterioration and increased maintenance costs. See Domestic
Common CarrierRegulation:Hearings on H.R. 7047Before the Subcomm. on Communications
of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, supra note 10 (statement of Eugene
V. Rostow on behalf of AT&T). The arguments regarding technical harm to network integrity
are ably discussed in Report on the Panel on Common Carrier/User Interconnections, Computer Science and Engineering Board, National Academy of Sciences, A TechnicalAnalysis of
the Common Carrier/UserInterconnections Area (report to Common Carrier Bureau, FCC,
June, 1970). See also Note, Competition in the Telephone Equipment Industry: Beyond Telerent, 86 YALE L.J. 538, 546 & n.33 (1977) (concluding that AT&T's argument is "overstated").
Cf. Baker, Competition and Regulation: Charles River Bridge Recrossed, 60 CORNELL L. REV.
159 (1975).

The specter of technical harm is also potentially relevant to specialized common carrier
competition, although less forcefully than to terminal equipment interconnection competition,
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permit providers from outside the network to offer alternative communications services or facilities which, because they may be used interchangeably
with network-originated offerings, threaten the revenues and thus the

economic health and stability of the network providers-the "economic
harm" or "cream-skimming" principle. 156 Finally, the FCC may not prohibit the network from providing any new telecommunications-related service or facility, whether within or beyond the scope of conventional network

offerings, particularly where providers outside the network have begun or
are planning to make that service or facility available- the "unrestricted
157

entry" principle.
These four principles constitute the operative rules of the new model of
the Communications Act. In combination, they suggest that the fundamental

purpose of regulation of telecommunications under the Communications Act
is to ensure the presence of a single, expansive, unified communications
network which operates as a monopoly and is protected from competition
which either duplicates existing network services or threatens to do technical
since AT&T is required to interconnect the services provided by specialized common carriers.
See 47 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1970).
156. The "economic harm" principle has been invoked in both interconnection and
specialized common carrier challenges. With regard to interconnection, competitive manufacture and installation of terminal equipment may reduce AT&T revenues and thereby result in
increased prices for basic residential and business service. The claim regarding specialized
common carriers is that, whether they are truly specialized or merely duplicative, their operations threaten to "skim the cream" off AT&T long-distance revenues, which AT&T claims
subsidize local service, again meaning increased basic telephone rates. See Domestic Common
CarrierRegulation: Hearings on H.R. 7047 Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, supra note 10 (statement of Eugene V.
Rostow on behalf of AT&T). Cf. Baker, supra note 155.
The fact that AT&T has relied on both the "technical harm" and "economic harm" prongs
of the protected-monopoly argument in attacking the interconnection and terminal equipment
decisions, while resting more heavily on the "duplicative competition" prong in attacking the
specialized common carrier cases, may be a semi-conscious reflection of the difference between the "core" of the system and its peripheral elements. Although the independent production of terminal equipment is strongly duplicative of the functions performed in the Bell system
by Western Electric, Western Electric may not be close enough to the system core to be
protected by a prohibition on duplication. On the other hand, long-distance communications
facilitated by the specialized carriers closely resemble those carried out by AT&T's long lines,
which must be at the core of any statutorily franchised monopoly. For core services, the
"duplication" attack is strong, and resort to the technological and economic claims used to
defend peripheral services-claims which, although arguable on social and economic grounds,
are difficult to find in the law itself-is not required.
157. See, e.g., The Great Telephone Debate 65, 68. AT&T has been especially bitter about
what it calls the "protective umbrella" given the specialized common carriers by restrictions on
AT&T participation in new forms of private line and data processing services. See, e.g., id. 68.
It is not only voice commutiications-the traditional service provided by AT&T and the
independent telephone companies-which this vision of franchised monopoly encompasses.
Record communications may be included as well. See id. ("[A]s technology abolished the older
distinctions between voice and record services, . . . the scope of the network should be
adjusted accordingly").
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or economic harm to the network. In operation, these principles would
constrict the range of policy choices open to the FCC and would compel the
conclusion that FCC procompetition rules contravene the basic tenets of the
federal regulatory scheme and should thus be retracted.
Whether these principles are the most logical deductions from the
vision of a "natural public utility franchise," and whether their implications
for recent FCC policies are as their proponents contend, remain open to
debate. As a preliminary matter, however, it must first be determined
whether or not these principles, and the vision they embody, possess
cognizable legal roots in the 1934 Act. It is this threshold inquiry to which
attention must initially be turned.
B.

The Legal Basis for the New Model.

Until recently, the legal foundation supporting the franchised monopoly model has been plagued by an all but impenetrable ambiguity. From its
earliest formulations, the legal assault on the Carterfone and Specialized
Common Carrierdecisions and their progeny has consisted of an amorphous combination of the legislative history of the Act, interpretation of its
specific provisions and its broader scheme, and extrapolations from the
overall social and legislative environment in which the seventy-third
Congress acted. 15 8 Only with the increased attention currently being given
the debate over the structure of the telecommunications market-largely
precipitated by suggestions in 1976 that the Communications Act be overhauled 5 9 -have positions on the legal front of the competition battle crystalized.
In support of the new model, the proponents of the franchised-monopoly reading of the Act have woven together four principal sources of law: the
statement of purposes of federal communications regulation found in the
Act; 1 the implications of specific provisions of Title II, most notably
section 215;161 references in the legislative history to the existence of
monopolistic industry structure; 162 and a general sense of the milieu surrounding the passage of the Act-including the cumulative experience and
158. See Domestic Common CarrierRegulation:Hearingon H.R. 7047Before the Subcomm.
on Communications of the House Comm. on Interstateand Foreign Commerce, supra note 10
(statement of Eugene V. Rostow on behalf of AT&T); brief for NARUC, supra note 10, at 30
(inquiry into FCC competition policy begins with "consideration of the social milieu which
precipitated congressional action, the legislative history, the language of the Communications

Act, and the scheme established by the Act").
159. See note 10 supra.

160. Communications Act of 1934 § 1, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1970). See notes 164-203 infra and
accompanying text.
161. Communications Act of 1934 § 215, 47 U.S.C. § 215-(1970). See notes 205-10 infra and
accompanying text.
162. See notes 211-28 infra and accompanying text.
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practice of federhl regulation from 1910 to 1934 and the universal expectations about the telecommunications business existing at that time. 163

1. Section 1: The Service-To-All Clause. Perhaps the most interesting argument in favor of a statutorily franchised telecommunications
monopoly invests the Act's opening statement of purposes with significant
substantive content which both embraces the monopoly model and limits

FCC discretion in its regulation.164 Prior to the competition debate, section 1
lay dormant, seldom used by the courts and the Commission for more than
an hortatory function. 165 As a general practice, regulatory decisions have
been made and reviewed primarily with reference to the "public convenience and necessity" or "public convenience, interest, or necessity" stan-

dards of Titles II and II, respectively; 166 the specific substantive policy
goals enumerated by section 1-adequate service to all at reasonable
charges, national defense and safety-have at most played only secondary
roles in explaining regulatory actions. More frequently, they have been
ignored altogether. With the attempt to fashion limits on the discretion of the
FCC to implement the public interest standards of Titles I and I, however,
the language of section 1, particularly its service-to-all clause, has taken on

new importance.
The service-to-all clause has not yet been explored in depth. Even those
who have used it to reinforce the franchised monopoly model have merely

cited section 1 to support conclusory generalizations about the policy of the
Act. 167 More recently, however, proponents of the franchised monopoly
163. See notes 229-50 infra and accompanying text.
164. The full text of section 1, as currently enacted, reads:
For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication by
wire and radio so as to make available, so far as possible, to all the people ofthe United
States a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication
service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges, for the purpose of the national
defense, for the purpose of promoting safety of life and property through the use of
wire and radio communication, and for the purpose of securing a more effective
execution of this policy by centralizing authority heretofore granted by law to several
agencies and by granting additional authority with respect to interstate and foreign
commerce in wire and radio communication, there is created a commission to be
known as the "Federal Communications Commission," which shall be constituted as
hereinafter provided, and which shall execute and enforce the provisions of this
chapter.
47 U.S.C. § 151 (1970) (emphasis added).
165. See, e.g., United States v. Southwest Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 167 (1968); National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 214 (1943); Washington Util. & Transp.
Comm. v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142, 1157 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1976).
166. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 214(a), 303 (1970).
167. See note 168 infra. See AT&T, Memorandum With Respect to Department of Justice
Analysis of Legislative History as Set Forth in Letter from Assistant Attorney General Donald
I. Baker to the Hon. Timothy E. Wirth (AT&T memorandum) (March 1, 1977), reprinted In 123
CONG. REc. E1357 (daily ed. March 9, 1977): "[The service-to-all clause], in particular, makes it
plain that Congress envisioned a system optimized in accordance with modern engineering
networking concepts in which each company participating in the provision of service would
become an integral part of a coordinated nationwide network."
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model have argued that by describing certain service, safety and defense
goals as the aims of all communications regulation, section 1 limits the types
of industry structure the FCC can find to be within the public interest

standards of Title H-.168 They claim that by announcing an overriding
regulatory goal, the service-to-all clause defines the public interest standard
which is to guide the Commission's decisions and subsequent judicial
review.

The use of a statutory statement of policy such as section 1 to modify or
define the Act's standards is a legitimate method of statutory interpretation. 169 The statement's relevance in assessing the procompetitive decisions
raises the difficult question of what section 1, and particularly the serviceto-all clause, means. There are sizeable problems in the construction and

interpretation of the clause which drastically limit its usefulness as a guide to
determining the appropriate mix of monopoly and competition in the telecommunications market. It is therefore not surprising that the role of the

clause in the creation of the legal model of franchised monopoly has been
vague and essentially rhetorical.
(a)

The background of the service-to-all clause.

Almost all of the

language of the Communications Act of 1934 was taken without substantial
change from the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended by the Mann-Elkins,

Esch-Cummins and Willis-Graham Acts. The committees responsible for
the drafting of the Act assured their colleagues that the legislation contained
little that did not appear in the transportation laws. 170 Yet, although it
168. See, e.g., The Great Telephone Debate 64:
While Congress gave the Commission broad discretion in interpreting the statutory
standard of the public interest, there were limits . . . inherent in the policies of
Section 1 of the Act which directed the FCC to encourage universal service on the
cheapest and most efficient basis. The supporters of [the new model] believe that this
direction requires the FCC to allow the network, as a regulated natural monopoly, to
provide all the communications services within its capabilities.
169. See A. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 20.12, at 63-64 (4th
ed., Sands ed. 1972). There is a crucial distinction between statements of policy which, like
section 1, follow the enacting clause of the legislation and become part of the statute, and
statutory preambles, which precede the enacting clause (usually as a litany of "whereas"
clauses) and are not part of the statutory law. Policy statements, as a rule, are available to
clarify ambiguous substantive provisions of the statute, but cannot be used to create ambiguities. There are, however, scattered examples of much more aggressive use of policy
statements, including some by the Supreme Court. See A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (largely discredited case); Dayton-Goose Creek R. Co. v.
United States, 263 U.S. 456 (1924). See also Note, Legal Effect of Preambles-Statutes, 41
CORNELL L.Q. 134 (1955).
Thus, in order for section I to be relevant under the usual rules of statutory interpretation,
there must be some ambiguity in the remainder of Title I or in the provisions of Titles II and III,
which section I may clarify. Most of the Communications Act is ambiguous enough to authorize recourse to section I as an interpretive aid, particularly in areas such as interconnection,
specialized carriage and data transmission.
170. See text accompanying notes 114-23 supra.
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slipped through without comment, there was one unique addition: the farreaching statement in section 1 that the purpose of federal communications
regulation was to "make available . . . to all . . . a rapid, efficient,
17 1
Nation-wide . . .communication service."
The Commerce Act amendments of 1910, 1920 and 1921 contained no
declarations of policy; in fact, communications had been specifically excluded from the comparable statement of policy in the Esch-Cummins Act,
which the 1934 Act eventually displaced. 172 Nothing in the preamble to the
Radio Act swept as broadly. 173 The drafters of the Communications Act
thereby put on record, for the first (and only) time, Congress' all-embracing
goal with respect to communications regulations.
Surprisingly, this potentially important new provision has virtually no
legislative history. The original versions of the Communications Act, which
were drafted principally by the administration 74 and introduced the day
after President Roosevelt's message as S. 2910 and H.R. 8301, opened with
this statement of dual purpose:
For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in
communication by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as
possible, to all the people of the United States a rapid, efficient,
Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service
with adequate facilities at reasonable charges, and for the purpose of
securing a more effective execution of this policy by centralizing authority heretofore granted by law to several agencies and by granting
additional authority with respect to interstate and foreign commerce in
75
wire and radio communication, there is hereby created [the FCC].1
A third goal, "the national defense," was added in committee. 176 The
official documents of the House did not mention the existence of the
purposes section except to parrot it in passing. The Senate report noted that
section 1 "declares the policy of Congress, assuring an adequate communi171. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
172. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
173. The preamble to the Radio Act contained the following language:

[Tihis Act is intended to regulate all forms of interstate and foreign radio transmission
and communications within the United States . . .; to maintain the control of the
United States over all the channels of interstate and foreign radio transmission; and to
provide for the use of such channels, but not the ownership thereof, by individuals,
firms, or corporations, for limited periods of time, under licenses granted by Federal
authority ....
Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 632, ch. 169, § 1, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927) (repealed 1934). This
statement of purposes was carried forward essentially unchanged as section 301 of the

Communications Act.
174. 78 CoNrG. REC. 8822 (1934) (remarks of Sen. Dill).
175. S. 2910, H.R. 8301, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) (emphasis added).
176. S. 3285, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) (committee bill). The fourth goal of the Act as it
currently stands, "for the purpose of promoting safety of life and property through the use of

wire and radio communication," was added by amendment in 1937. Act of May 20, 1937, Pub.
L. No. 97, ch. 229, § 1, 50 Stat. 189 (1937) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1970)).
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cations system for this country,"' 177 but said no more, and the Senate debate
and the conference committee were completely silent on this provision. No
indication was made at any point in the official documents or record of what
the language means, how far it reaches or from where it was derived.
It is still possible, of course, to speculate about likely sources of this
"service-to-all" concept and language. During the debate on the last major
legislative action in the telecommunications area prior to 1934, the 1921
Willis-Graham Act, Representative Graham chose an almost identical way
of articulating the federal interest in telecommunications: "I think I am
stating the opinion of most men who have carefully considered the matter,
that it is believed to be better policy to have one telephone system in a
community that serves all the people . . . than it is to have two competing
telephone systems.' ' 78 It might be that section 1 was designed to refer
specifically to this statement, carrying the national aim of communications
regulation as expressed on the floor of the House into the statutes. Or it may
have been that the concept first enunciated by Theodore Vail in 1907179 of a
unified, singly-managed telephone system providing universal telephone
service under government regulation, found its way into the preamble of the
Act by either tacit or unconscious adoption. And again, it may simply have
been that the "service-to-all" language represented a highly generalized and
diffuse shared sense of the fundamental aim of communications providers
and regulators without any specific content concerning how that service was
to be provided. That the central goal of regulating communications was to
make service available to all was something everyone could agree on in
1934 without giving up disagreements about the best way to accomplish that
goal. 180 Or the "service-to-all" language may have been in reality nothing
more than New Deal boilerplate, intended to provide the FCC with something that would pass for an "intelligible principle" to guide itsregulation
and thereby satisfy the courts' requirement that policy-making powers not
be delegated by Congress without providing some standard for their use by
177. S. REP. No. 781, supra note 95, at 3.
178. 61 CONG. REC. 1983 (1921) (remarks of Rep. Graham) (emphasis added).

179. AT&T ANNUAL REPORT 17-18, 28 (1907); see Gabel, supra note 15, at 356. An accessible early explication of the Bell viewpoint of this era can be found in an article by Arthur

Stedman Hills, a Bell lawyer, The Telephone as a Public Utility, 21 CASE AND COMMENT 881
(1915). This concept, which is summarized in the Bell slogan, "one system, one policy,

universal service," FCC,

INVESTIGATION OF THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES,

H.R. Doc. No. 340, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 145-46 (1939), was advanced by Bell officials at the

hearings on the 1934 legislation. Hearingson H.R. 8301 at 200-01 (testimony of W. Gifford on
behalf of AT&T).

180. Compare Hearings on H.R. 8301 at 200 (testimony of W. Gifford on behalf of AT&T)
(supporting the position that telephone service to all is best provided by limiting competition),

with id. 267 (testimony of D. Friday on behalf of the independent telephone companies)
(arguing that competition provides the better method for providing telephone service to the
public).
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administrative agencies. 18 ' The question of which, if any, of these speculative explanations is the correct one is not clearly addressed or resolved by
the record.
(b) Exploring the meaning of "service-to-all." Nevertheless, it can
be argued that, at some point in attempting to understand modern statutes,
recourse to legislative history must yield to a close reading of the language
and construction of the statute itself. As expressed by one court, "an
explanatory tale should not wag a statutory dog."' 82 Particularly with
congressional documents as unilluminating as those regarding this issue,
what the Act may be read to say on its face becomes doubly important. And
a close reading of the "service-to-all" clause can unearth an alternative
reading of the Act that is at odds with the more traditional view that nothing
more was accomplished in 1934 than the creation of a unified regulatory
mechanism for communications.
In the first place, the construction of section 1 may in some measure
belie the traditional argument that more effective regulation was the Act's
primary goal. As now constituted, the statement of purposes for the Act has
four separate clauses: the first announcing the "service-to-all" concept,
followed by the "national defense" and "safety of life and property"
clauses, and finally the "more effective execution" clause. 8 3 Only the first
and the last were part of the original drafts of the Communications Act
introduced on February 27, 1934; the "national defense" clause was added
after the committee hearings. 184 As originally conceived, then, the Act can
be read to have had a dominant aim of achieving insofar as possible
"service-to-all," and a subordinate aim of "securing a more effective
execution of this policy" by centralizing and expanding on the existing
federal authority over communications. As currently written, the Act adds
two complementary goals to the initial dominant theme of "service-to-all"
and makes all three the cumulative policy which the final "more effective
execution" clause is to serve. Regardless then of what Congress said about
desiring only to legislate the more effective regulation of which both
181. In 1934 the "intelligible principle" rule of the Hampton case was still the leading
authority on delegation of legislative and quasi-legislative powers by Congress, and no statute
had yet been struck down for unconstitutional delegation. See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v.
United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (requiring Congress to lay down an "intelligible
principle to which the [agency] . . .is directed to conform"). The confusion that arose in the
delegation doctrine with the Schecter and PanamaRefining cases striking down the National
Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 was still to come. A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
182. A.P. Green Export Co. v. United States, 284 F.2d 383, 386 (Ct. Cl. 1960) (Jones, J.). See
generally R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTEs 164-75 (1975).
183. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).

184. See text accompanying note 176 supra. See address by David Sarnoff, supra note 133.
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Chairman Rayburn and Chairman Dill spoke during the debates, 8 5 the terms
of section 1 place the goal of effective regulation within the larger context of
the broad "service-to-all" policy and its complements.
This may be to say no more than that Congress for the first time in 1934
articulated what had in fact been the national communications policy at least
since 1921 (and possibly since 1910), that at the heart of that policy had
been "service-to-all," and that section 1 therefore did not change the
existing law any more than did the provisions that follow it. This would
accord with the general suggestion in the legislative record that no change
was intended. But whether the "service-to-all" concept was something new
or just a verbalization of what had been implied before, that it precedes the
statement of the goal of better regulation and announces the considerations
that are to inform the exercise of that regulation indicate that more than a
simple restructuring and streamlining of the regulatory process was achieved
by the Act. The regulatory process was given a set of substantive aimsservice, safety and defense-and arguably those aims placed substantive
limits on what directions the regulatory process could take. Assuming for
the moment that it can be shown that economic or technical harm to the
statutory network from any specific form of competition has the effect of
retarding the achievement of these service, safety or defense aims, it could
then be argued that the structure of section 1 precludes the FCC from
permitting that competitive offering.
Furthermore, beyond the construction of section 1, the actual language
of the "service-to-all" clause may serve to amplify the importance of the
section in the Communications Act scheme. As the Supreme Court has
noted in a classic passage on statutory interpretation, the "words by which
the legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes . . . [o]ften...
are sufficient in and of themselves to determine the purpose of the legislation." 186 Within the words of the "service-to-all" clause, it can be argued,
there is an "expression of wishes" which speaks over the cacaphony of the
legislative history. To reiterate, the clause states the purpose of the Act as
"regulating interstate and foreign commerce on communication by wire and
radio so as to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the
United States a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide and world-wide wire and radio
187
communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges."
The important point to note about this clause is that it contemplates not
"communication service" in the broad, generic sense but rather "a...
communications service." It might be argued that this phrase does not
include service provided by whomever has the wherewithal to enter the
185. See text accompanying notes 115 & 121 supra.
186. United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940).
187. Communications Act of 1934, § 1, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1970) (emphasis added).
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communications business and in whatever form the market forces may
eventually dictate but, rather, means that the service is to be provided by a
single, unified, national communications concern, with the strong monopolistic characteristics that the.phrase implies. By contrast, the declaration of
purposes for the Esch-Cummins Act-from which communicati6ns was
clearly excluded- 88 -calls on the executing agency only to "promote, encourage, and develop water transportation service and facilities,"18 9 suggesting only the diffusion of maritime transportation services through a
multiplicity of providers 19° rather than centralized provision through "a"
service. In the communications area, on the other hand, the presence in
section 1 of the "a. . . communications service" language can be taken to
direct federal policy in the opposite direction, toward the maintenance of a
communications monopoly. The fact that this service was to be "rapid,
efficient, Nation-wide,- and world-wide," all factors which frequently are
invoked to defend monopoly market structures, 19 1 serves to reinforce the
notion that the drafters intended a centralized and exclusive provision of
communications capacities which were to be available to all.
To make the statutory policy toward the structure of the telecommunications industry turn on the drafters' choosing to express the "service-toall" policy in a singular rather than a plural mode, as this reading of the
clause suggests, would be extreme. If the drafters deliberately intended to
convey a significant shift from the policy of multiple providers implicit in
the language of the Transportation Act by qualifying the "service" aim with
the singular article "a," they would surely have said so at some point in the
legislative process. More likely, the language was the fortuitous product of a
simple literary choice.
Beyond this semantic concern, there are several deeper difficulties with
interpreting the "service-to-all" clause as channeling the regulatory powers
of the FCC toward maintenance of a franchised monopoly. First, as already
noted, the lack of legislative history giving any kind of signal in this
direction is forbidding. The entire purposes provision of the Act received
less than cursory mention in the committee reports and debates. 192 Even
193
admitting that resort to the legislative history is not always dispositive,
the overwhelming lack of attention paid to the language of section 1 by
188. See note 45 supra.
189. Transportation (Esch-Cummins) Act of 1920, Pub. L.No. 152, ch. 91, § 500, 41 Stat.
499 (repealed 1934) (emphasis added).
190. It should also be remembered that the Esch-Cummins Act instructed that railroad
"competition shall be preserved as fully as possible" as well. Id. § 407(4). See text accompanying note 44 supra.
191. See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).

192. See notes 175-77 supra and accompanying text.
193. See note 182 supra.
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Congress should discourage this kind of elaborate interpretation of unexplained statutory text.
Second, even granting that the definition of the goal of communications policy as service to all through "a communications service" indicates
some deliberate congressional choice to authorize a statutory telecommunications monopoly, the full language of the "service-to-all" clause brings
this argument toward the point of dissolving in ambiguity. This is so for two
reasons. In the first place, the statutory aim is "a . . . communication

service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges." This leaves some
range for the existence of alternative communications providers. The technical and economic insulation provided by section 1 would not reach all
competitive impacts; it would prohibit only those impacts which are serious
enough to threaten that the facilities of the statutory network will be
rendered inadequate or that the network's prices will be pushed to unreasonand "reasonableness," there is
able levels. Up to the limits of "adequacy"
94
statutory space for competitive entry. 1
More important, the determination of what array of facilities is "adequate" and what level of pricing is "unreasonable" leaves the FCC with
broad powers to say what the shape and extent of the statutory network is to
be. The elasticity of the terms "adequate" and "reasonable," like that of
196
the phrases "in the public interest," ' 195 "just and reasonable"' and "public convenience and necessity''197 in Title II of the Act, is practically
boundless. 198 "Adequate facilities" may conceivably be those which are
absolutely protected under the "technical harm" principle from technological decay or disruption from competitors' facilities, but that term may also
mean something much less expansive. Although charges might be considered unreasonable if they exceed the equilibrium price of perfect competition, the statute does not mandate the lowest prices possible, just "reasonable" ones. As a result, the FCC is left with a wide degree of discretion
in giving content to the terms of the "service-to-all" clause. To decide that
the clause envisions the maintenance of a statutory communication network
is to say little about how far the "adequate facilities" of the network are to
extend or what considerations will be legitimate in developing a "reasonable" set of charges for communications services.
194. This limited form of competition differs from the traditional model of competitive
services, to be sure, and those entering under this type of statutory authorization would be

subject to double risks: not only would they in all likelihood fall prey to the superior size and
range of competitive tactics open to the statutory network, but they would also be dependent on
the consistency of the FCC determination of where the limits of "adequate facilities" and
"reasonable charges" should be set.
195. 47 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1970).

196. Id.§ 201(b).
197. Id. § 214(c).
198. See IV B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 12.
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Moreover, even if the "service-to-all" clause is read as granting a
statutory monopoly, the full language of the clause leaves much doubt about

the scope of the "communication service" envisioned. The clause gives no
clue as to what types of service or facilities are at the core of the statutory

network, what types are on its perimeters, and what types (if any) are
beyond it. It is simply not clear from the clauses whether simple terminal
equipment or telephone handsets belong to the core or at the perimeter. 99
The answers must remain to be defined by the FCC, and answering them
would carry the Commission beyond the issues of adequacy and reasonableness of network facilities and charges, to the fundamental determination of
what is inside and what is outside the network. The text and history of
section 1 are too meager to give useful guidance in this task and the end
result does not differ much from the result of the more orthodox view of the
Act: the Commission is left with something close to a plenary power to
define the scope of the statutory network. That it would do so in the course
of constructing the specific terms of the "service-to-all" clause rather than
under the broader charter of the orthodox interpretation would be of little
2°°
real consequence.
Beyond these niceties of the construction and interpretation of the

"service-to-all"

clause, there is an even more compelling reason to reject

the "statutory monopoly" view of section 1 when seen in light of the
substantive provisions of the Act. Section 1 and the "service-to-all" clause
199. This is evident from the FCC's lengthy and as yet unresolved computer inquiry. See
Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and Communication Services and Facilities (Final Decision), 28 F.C.C.2d 267 (1971), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part sub nom. GTE Service Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1973); Regulatory and Policy
Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and Communication Services and
Facilities (Tentative Decision), 28 F.C.C.2d 291 (1970); Notice of Inquiry, Regulatory and
Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and Communication Services
and Facilities, 7 F.C.C.2d 11 (1966); Berman, supra note 129, at 169-78.
AT&T argues that data communications services, if not part of the monopoly franchise
itself, should at least be part of the broad range of services which the statutory monopoly is
permitted to offer. See note 157 supra.
200. This is particularly true in the American system of administrative law, in which courts
reviewing administrative actions usually defer to agency judgments about the meaning of
ambiguities in the statutes they interpret. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367, 381 (1969). A reviewing court might say that the FCC interpretation of whether a
certain type of service is inside or outside the statutory network is more readily challenged
when the agency is interpreting the meaning of statutory language than when it is exercising
judgment regarding technical or economic matters. But since courts are better trained in
interpreting statutes than in reviewing discretionary judgments, in matters as complex as those
involved in interconnection, specialized carriage and data tratsmission a court is likely to yield
to the agency's view of the Act. See Washington Util. & Transp. Comm. v. FCC, 513 F.2d
1142, 1157 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1976); cf. International Harvester Co. v.
Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 641, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (comments by Judges Leventhal and
Bazelon on the difficulty of judicial review of complex issues of technology, in this case vehicle
emissions standards under the Clean Air Act).
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apply not just to telecommunications but to broadcasting as well; the service
called for by the clause includes both "wire and radio communication."
This interpretation of section 1 would require the conclusion that a single
monopoly was mandated by the Act to supply both telecommunications and
radio service, since the "service-to-all" clause should be interpreted identically for both telecommunications and radio communications. Yet the provisions of Title M and the history of radio regulation both before and after the
Act make it clear that no radio monopoly was to exist. The fundamental
national policy toward radio communications was in 1934 and has always
been to maintain a multiplicity of broadcast operators. 20 1 Reading section 1
20 2
in the manner proposed here would completely undermine that policy.
On examination, then, it should be apparent that there are formidable
difficulties in attributing a wide-ranging substantive role in the law of
telecommunications to the "service-to-all" clause of section 1. While the
opening statement of purposes may be used to clarify statutory ambiguities,203 the statement of statutory purposes in the case of the Communications Act is in many ways even more ambiguous than the regulatory
standards which it attempts to define. Its ability to contribute to the analysis
of the legal limits on FCC competitive policy is therefore marginal, and its
place in the regulatory process is more likely to remain primarily hortatory.
2. Fundamental Structural Change Under Section 215. As a second ground of support for the new model, its proponents interpret several of
the specific terms of Title II and conclude that fundamental changes in the
structure of the telecommunications industry were reserved for congressional (and not administrative) action. Their argument relies heavily upon
section 215 of the Act. 204
Under section 215, three of the more controversial problems regarding
the 1934 structure of the telephone and telegraph industries were reserved
for later congressional consideration: the internal corporate structure of the
AT&T system (centered on AT&T as the parent holding company for
operating subsidiaries); the cross-industry competition caused by Bell's
providing telegraph services; and the exclusive dealing arrangements of
some carriers with their users. 2 5 The congressional sponsors of the section
201. See FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470,474 (1939) ("the Act recognizes
that the field of broadcasting is one of free competition").
202. But there may be an interesting parallel between the local geographic monopoly policy
indicated by the Willis-Graham Act, see notes 69-72 supra and accompanying text, and the
effective local wavelength monopoly granted to broadcast licensees. To the extent that both
reflect a policy of local monopoly over basic telecommunications and broadcasting services, it
is not inconsistent that wire and radio communications are joined in the section 1 statement of
purposes while treated separately elsewhere in the Act.
203. See note 169 supra.
204. See The Great Telephone Debate 64.
205. See note 127 supra.
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indicated that its purpose was to postpone consideration of these structural
issues until the new FCC could investigate and "recommend . . .legislation for their solution." 206 The advocates of the franchised monopoly read
section 215 to indicate that by postponing the consideration of these problems and by indicating that their solution was to come in the form of new
legislation, the seventy-third Congress declared its intent to retain authority
over basic structural change in telecommunications. As a result, the argument concludes, the power to reshape the industry was not delegated to the
FCC but was reserved by Congress and therefore, the FCC's recent decisions opening the way for competitive offerings exceed the range of ad2 °7
ministrative actions authorized by the statute.
As a threshold matter, there may be reason to discount the claim that
the services authorized by the Carterfone and SpecializedCommon Carrier
decisions threaten to produce a fundamental structural change requiring such
Congress-only treatment. 20 But assuming for the moment that such a
showing could be made, it appears that the section 215 reservations fall
short of supporting the franchised monopoly view. In the first place, section
215 does not explicitly deprive the FCC of authority to make basic structural
changes in the telecommunications industry, provided those actions are
found to satisfy the overriding public interest standards of Title II. Nothing
in the terms or legislative history of section 215 specifically precludes the
interpretation that the Commission was to share with Congress concurrent
jurisdiction over fundamental change. The fact that the section envisions the
possibility of further legislation on the reserved problem areas need not
mean that FCC activity in those areas was foreclosed; the section may have
had a more modest aim of satisfying critics and defenders of the 1934
industry structure by the familiar compromise tactic of authorizing a thorough study of the problem by a newly-created expert agency. Given the
legislators' explicit concern with creating a more effective regulatory
body 2° and their failure to expressly limit that body's powers by section
215, the interpretation that best harmonizes the terms of that section with
those of the entire Act would provide that both Congress and the FCC
possess the power to fundamentally restructure the industry.
206. H.R. REP. No. 1850, supra note 95, at 3.

207. See The Great Telephone Debate 64 ("Section 215 represents one limit [on FCC
discretion] in its reservation to the Congress of jurisdiction over problems of fundamental
structural change"). This passage overstates the argument somewhat, since Congress always
retains its jurisdiction; the issue is whether Congress declined to share that jurisdiction with the
administrative agency.

208. An economic analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article. See generally
FCC, ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS AND INTERRELATIONSHIPS ARISING FROM POLICIES AND PRACTICES RELATING TO CUSTOMER INTERCONNECTION, JURISDICTIONAL SEPARATIONS AND RATE
STRUCTURES, reprinted in 61 F.C.C.2d 766 (1976).
209. See text accompanying notes 114-23 supra.
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Second, under traditional statutory interpretation, the reservations of
authority in section 215 should be read to apply only to the three structural
issues specifically mentioned in the provisions of the section. The development of federal telecommunications regulation strongly indicates that
Congress delegated first to the ICC and then to the FCC the full extent of
congressional authority over interstate commerce in telecommunications .210
The most consistent explanation of this plenary delegation is that the
Communications Act clothed the FCC with full authority to act as the agent
of the legislature in accomplishing the public interest, subject only to the
explicit reservations carved out of the delegation in section 215 and elsewhere. Under this interpretation, the argument made by proponents of the
franchised monopoly model is undermined: in light of the broad grant of
authority to the FCC, the reservation of congressional action over a set of
specific problems cannot appropriately be generalized to declare an acrossthe-board congressional reservation of authority over fundamental structural
change, to the exclusion of the agency charged with telecommunications
regulation.
3. The Legislative History. In the legislative histories of the
Communications Act and its sister Public Utility Holding Company Act of
1935,21 the argument for the franchised monopoly model finds a third basis
of support. Its proponents focus on floor remarks by the committee chairmen responsible for the 1934 Act and on comments at congressional hearings by one of the leading contemporary authorities on industry regulation as
evidence that Congress undertook a careful reexamination of the telecommunications industry structure,- including the expanding2 Bell monopoly, and
21
concluded that the structure should not be changed.
However, only a portion of the support claimed to exist in the legislative history can be gleaned from the general remarks made during the
consideration of the Communications Act. Those remarks indicate merely
that Congress recognized the effective monopoly possessed by AT&T in
1934. A prominent example is the comment of Senator Dill:
I think it is generally well known by those who know anything about the
set-up of the telephone monopoly, that under the present arrangement
the parent telephone company, the American Telephone & Telegraph,
not only owns the operating companies in the principal cities in the
210. See text accompanying notes 54-56, 141 supra.
211. 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1970).

212. See, e.g., AT&T Memorandum, supra note 167, at E1357. Moreover, the AT&T
Memorandum notes that the fact that in section 215(b) of the Act Congress instructed the FCC
to investigate provision of telegraph service by telephone companies may show that Congress
not only preserved the telephone monopoly, but also indicated concern over the most visible
form of service competition then present-the competition between telephone and telegraph
companies for record communications business. Id.
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United States ... but it owns the manufacturing company, the Western Electric, which supplies the operating companies with the equipment of the telephone business, and there is no competitive bidding on
the part of
those who would sell equipment to the operating
213
companies.
Similar remarks were made by Congressman Rayburn. 214 The point is
inarguable: Congress understood that the industry structure which had

developed and which was to be subjected to FCC regulation was monopolistic. But it is equally obvious that none of the congressional statements in
itself indicates particular enthusiasm for this monopoly structure; the statements represent a recognition of the fact that little competition existed, not a
policy directed toward that result. Standing alone, the comments of the
Act's sponsors tell little about the role envisioned for competitive services or

facilities in the regulatory scheme.
The more forceful argument based on legislative history relies not on
materials related to the Communications Act, but on the Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935, by which Congress restructured the power
industry by breaking up the holding companies which dominated electric
and gas services. 215 During hearings on the 1935 Utility Act, the author of
the extensive investigative report which laid the groundwork for the

Communications Act, Dr. William Splawn, appeared before both
Commerce Committees to explain his recommendation that utility holding
companies be abolished. 2 16 In the House hearings, Splawn explained that
organization of the power business on a national scale was unnecessary
because "[t]he power business is not like the telephone business." 2 17 He

expanded on this conclusion six weeks later at the Senate hearings:
213. 78 CONG. REC. 8824 (1934).
214. Id. 10314 ("The competition in the industry will run about as follows: Telephone:
American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 95 percent of the business; 100 independent companies,
5 percent of the business. . . .In telephone service the American Telephone & Telegraph is
practically a monopoly").
215. See generally Public Utility Holding Companies: Hearings on H.R. 5423 Before the
House Comm. on Interstateand Foreign Commerce, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935); Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935: Hearings on S. 1725 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935); J.BONBRIGHT & G. MEANS, THE HOLDING COMPANY 90-222 (1932).
216. See SPLAWN REPORT, supra note 89. Splawn was appointed pursuant to a 1932 resolution to investigate the holding company structure of the railroad, oil pipelining, communications
and power industries. By the time of the 1935 hearings he had been named an Interstate
Commerce Commissioner, but the bulk of the utility investigation had been carried out before
Splawn left his position as counsel to the House committee. See Public Utility Holding
Companies: Hearings on H.R. 5423 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, supra note 215, at 55.
217. Public Utility Holding Companies: Hearings on H.R. 5423 Before the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, supra note 215, at 180, quoted in Petition for Writ of
Certiorari 80, AT&T v. United States, 427 F. Supp. 57 (D.D.C. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1071 (1977). But see text accompanying note 222 infra.
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Someone seems to have had a dream that the electric power
business could be organized corporately and conducted very much as
the telephone business is. Now there is quite a difference in the physical operation of the two. The telephone, in order to be most useful, must
be connected through
switchboards with every other switchboard in the
21
entire country. 1
Relying upon distinctions drawn in the Splawn testimony and the treatment
of industry structure by the 1934 and 1935 Acts, 219 proponents of the
franchised monopoly reading of the Communications Act conclude that
Congress decided to freeze the monopolistic market structure, subjecting it
to pervasive regulation, rather than change it in the dramatic way in which
the breakup of electric and gas utility holding companies was accomplished.
The Splawn remarks do lend credence to this conclusion particularly
given Splawn's central role in the development of telecommunications
legislation during the New Deal era. Viewed in their entirety, however, both
Splawn's comments and the holding company divestiture requirements of
the 1935 Act are considerably less than compelling evidence that the
Communications Act was aimed at foreclosing telecommunications competition.
In the first place, the dichotomy alluded to by Splawn was not, as the
incomplete quotation of his remarks suggests, simply between the power
and the telephone industries. In its full context, the sentence partially quoted
above 220 reads: "The power business is not like the telephone business or
the railroadbusiness, transcontinental or essentially an interstate proposition. '"221 This linking of the telephone and railroad industries belies an
interpretation of the Splawn testimony as supporting the franchised monopoly view. Because railroad regulation did not treat new competition as
inimical, at least prior to the decline of the rails brought about by the advent
of air transportation, the contrast drawn by Splawn between the power,
telephone and railroad industries can hardly constitute prima facie proof that
the divergent legislative approaches taken by Congress in 1934 and 1935
express adoption of the new model's "true faith."
Indeed, the full context of the Splawn testimony shows that a welter of
factors entered into the congressional judgment that electric and gas utility
218. Public Utility Holding Companies: Hearings on H.R. 5423 Before the House Comm. on
Interstateand Foreign Commerce, supra note 215, at 75.
219. While the 1934 Communications Act left the structure of telecommunications unchanged-with AT&T operating long-distance lines and holding control of its operating subsidiariesthe 1935 Public Utility Act ordered divestiture by the utility holding companies of manufacturing and operating subsidiaries. See 15 U.S.C. § 79k (1970).
220. See text accompanying note 217 supra.
221. Public Utility Holding Companies:Hearings on H.R. 5423 Before the House Comm. on
Interstateand Foreign Commerce, supra note 215, at 180.
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holding companies served no useful end. Starting with the sentence just
discussed, Splawn told the House Committee:
The power business is not like the telephone business or the railroad
business, transcontinental or essentially an interstate proposition. Its
operations are at the most regional. Many of the soundest operations
are altogether intrastate and may be designated as local . . . . This is
an industry which is essentially local and which . . . should be
managed locally, and therefore regulated locally ....
. . . [Earlier testimony] has shown you the abuses that have
grown out of these interregional holding-company activities. . . . [T]o
reach all of these abuses, you will have about 32 different bills or
different sorts of approach ....
' . . [W]hen you try to reach out to regulate them [rather than
breaking up the holding companies]. . . , [y]ou would not be regulating
public utilities. They are often not operating anything, but merely hold
securities.222
At the Senate hearings, Splawn went on in the passage from his Senate
testimony partially quoted above 223 to describe, in addition to technical
interconnection differences, differences in the corporate operations of the
telephone and power industries that called for different legislative treatment:
Now, there is quite a difference in the physical operation of the two.
The telephone, in order to be most useful, must be connected through
switchboards with every other switchboard in the entire country. And
you find in that industry a holding-operating company, rather close to
the operations which you are undertaking to regulate through your
agency, the FederalCommunications Commission.
But in the power field there is no such situation or transcontinental
transmission of power. . . . The physical set-up in this operation is
local and, at most, regional. There is nothing Nation-wide about this
set-up except the corporate structure, the intangible
thing superim224
posed upon these local physical operations.
Thus, Splawn distinguished the differing needs for structural change in
the telephone and power businesses on at least four grounds. First, there
were technological differences dictating nationwide interconnection of telecommunications services and facilities which were not present for the stillembryonic electric power system. Second, there was an underlying sentiment, akin to a federalism concern, that an industry which was truly local in
every way but its ownership should be regulated by states or municipalities;
rather than intervene to regulate the industry because it was held in interstate
conglomerations, the federal government should dismantle the industry's
222. Id. 180-81 (emphasis added).

223. See text accompanying note 218 supra.
224. Public Utility Holding Companies:Hearings on H.R. 5423 Before the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, supra note 215, at 75.
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unproductive interstate characteristics. Third, there existed in the power
industry a record of abuses by the electric and gas utility holding companies
which aroused the ire of the congressional committees and which had no
apparent counterpart in the telecommunications industry. 225 Finally, there
were important differences in Splawn's comparison of the corporate arrangement of AT&T and the utility holding companies: while the latter
"merely h[e]ld securities" while "not operating anything," 226 the AT&T
holding company was not only "rather close to the operations" 227 of the
subsidiaries whose securities it held, but also actively engaged in operating
228 that
the AT&T long distance lines. It was not a "mere paper company"
transformed local into regional activity purely for the sake of enlarging its
economic holdings and control.
Given the lack of technical or service functions and the abusive conduct
of the utility holding companies, it is understandable why Splawn and the
1935 Congress chose to reshape the power industry radically, only a year
after following a more conservative course in the Communications Act. The
two industries were not similarly situated, for reasons that were more
complex and more immediate than the economic explanation that the telephone business inclines toward a centralized, nation-wide monopoly while
the electric and gas utility service requires only local and independent
monopoly providers.
This is not to say that the divergent concepts of optimum industry
structures present in the Splawn testimony and in the 1934 and 1935 Acts
have no significance. But it is important to place the genesis of those
differing concepts in full context. Doing so illustrates that from the standpoint of legislative history, the fact that Congress ordered the amputation of
centralized ownership in the electric and gas industries while leaving the
1934 structure of the telecommunications industry intact cannot be explained entirely, or even primarily, by the view that Congress endorsed the
franchised monopoly model in the Communications Act but did not do so in
the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. While the floor remarks
concerning the Communications Act and the contrast between treatment of
telecommunications and power industry structures may help-to illuminate
the general environment in which the Act was passed, neither is very
strongly indicative of the franchised monopoly model.
225. Power industry abuses are noted throughout the 1935 hearings. That there were few
comparable contemporary abuses by telecommunications holding companies-i.e., AT&T-is

indicated by the relative lack of allegations of abuse in the Communication Act hearings and
debates. See notes 33 & 38 supra; notes 110-48 supra and accompanying text.
226. See text accompanying note 221 supra.
227. See text accompanying note 223 supra.

228. Public Utility Holding Companies:Hearingson H.R. 5423 Before the House Comm. on
Interstateand Foreign Commerce, supra note 215, at 180.
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4. The Expression of the 1934 Milieu: The "Common Carrier
Concept. " Although the foregoing arguments regarding the "service-toall" clause, section 215 and the legislative history are important cornerstones of the franchised monopoly model, the core of the vision of the "true
faith" lies elsewhere, in an organizing concept which assertedly has governed the development of telecommunications regulation from its earliest
stages and which found expression in the general plan of Title J1.229 By
providing the broadest and most accurate reflection of the universal understandings and expectations of the period in which the 1934 Act was formulated, it is argued, this concept announces a theory of industry structure
that is incompatible with the basic premises of competitive theory, leading
to the conclusion that Title II is "inconsistent with the notion that Congress
intended that reliance would be placed upon competition to govern the
provision of telecommunications service.'"230
In its most succinct form, the "common carrier concept" asserts that
"the theory of competition cannot rationally be applied to products or
services, the provision of which has been made subject to pervasive regulation.,"231 As with the application of most core concepts, the consequences of
this common carrier ideal for substantive regulatory rules are occasionally
diffuse and difficult to penetrate. But, as articulated by its proponents, the
concept is as blunt and simple as it sounds: the congressional decision to
engage in regulation of telecommunications carriers, once beyond the
threshold of pervasiveness, inevitably precludes competition in the regulated field. Thus, the choice to open the telecommunications field to
principles of the
competitive entry by new providers would be outside the
"common carrier concept" and beyond FCC authority. 232
The source of this concept is found in a panoramic view of the
2
development of the telecommunications industry structure prior to 1934. 33
229. See generally AT&T Memorandum, supra note 167, at E1357; The Great Telephone

Debate 65; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 217, at 70-83; Brief for NARUC, supra
note 10.
230. AT&T Memorandum, supra note 167, at E1357.
231.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 217, at 74, 83. A slightly less all-encom-

passing version of the concept is offered in The Great Telephone Debate. Cf. Hawaiian
Telephone Co. v. FCC , 498 F.2d 771, 777 (D.C. Cir. 1974): "The whole theory of licensing and
regulation by government agencies is based on the belief that competition cannot be trusted to
do the job of regulation in that particular industry which competition does in other sectors of
the economy."
232. Similarly, carriers would be immunized from competitive scrutiny under the antitrust
laws. See AT&T v. United States, 427 F. Supp. 57 (D.D.C. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1071
(1977) (Communications Act and regulatory powers of the FCC do not give implied immunity
from antitrust laws to the, companies operating under them).
233. It has been suggested that taking this panoramic view moves the discussion to a
"deeper and more jurisprudential" level. The Great Telephone Debate 65. There is a sense in
which the effort to bring into focus the context in which Congress acted has something of a
more "jurisprudential" character than the rather close attention to the language of the statute
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From the pattern in the early decades of this century of increasing industry
consolidation and state regulation and decreasing competition, 23 4 AT&T had
forged a centrally planned and operated partnership with the independent
companies which provided nationwide telephone service. Throughout this
period, Congress was aware of-and had even encouraged 2 3 5 -this monopolistic course. In 1934, by way of the Splawn investigation, Congress
assessed this development and embraced the no-competition principle of the
common carrier concept by electing to retain the monopoly structure and
subject it to comprehensive regulation. Thus, one commentator noted:
If one looks at the statute in its full context of practice and habit over a
period of 35 years as an integral part of the process of making decisions
of communications policy. . . it is obvious that Congress could have
had no other goal in mind, because a unified telephone network had
existed for a long time before the Act; it existed at the time the Act was
passed; and its legitimacy was not challenged until 1968. The
unified
236
network was the universal expectation reflected in the Act.
There is a strong appeal to this "totality of the circumstances" type of
approach, not the least part of which comes from the intuitive sense that had
the Congress intended in 1934 to alter this monopolistic course, it would
have done so. But there are flaws in the argument that raise doubts about the
strength with which it supports the principles of the franchised monopoly
model.
Most important, the argurhent is overstated. In suggesting that pervasive regulation necessarily carries with it the intent to freeze out competitive
entry into monopolistic market structures, the argument goes a step further
than the fact of regulation alone will propel it. The primary meaning of the
legislative choice to engage in comprehensive regulation is that the final
locus of authority over decisions affecting the price, availability and delivery of the regulated services should reside in a public body, not in private
hands. The fact of extensive regulation does not of itself lead to the
conclusion that a specific industry structure is mandated. Pervasive regulation is no more than just that: the commitment of the development of the
regulated field to the comprehensive oversight of the public agency. It need
not mean that the only proper subjects for regulation are monopoly providers.
and to supporting legislative documents. But it is important to remember two things. First, care
must be taken not to confuse deep jurisprudence with stratospheric musings. Second, while
there is an important need for recourse to the temper of the times in which legislation was
enacted, the more reliable mode of ascertaining legislative intent remains the examination of the
contemporary official records and materials. Calling an approach "more jurisprudential" does
not automatically make it the preferred technique of legal analysis.
234. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
235. See text accompanying notes 57-72 supra (discussing Willis-Graham Act merger authorization).
236. The Great Telephone Debate 65.
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This is not to say that the "common carrier concept" has no substantive content with regard to the roles of monopoly and competition in the
regulatory process. The undertaking of pervasive regulation of an industry
in which monopolies are already in place and in which the elements of
natural monopoly are strong does indicate that the practice of relying on
competitive forces alone to guide industry development has been judged
insufficient to promote the public interest. The existence of monopoly
structures is therefore to be expected. But the most that can be deduced
reliably from the adoption of a sweeping regulatory scheme is that the usual
presumption against monopolistic economic structures has been foregone by
the legislature. The deduction cannot be stretched to the point that competition in the regulated field is conclusively outlawed. Even assuming arguendo that pervasive regulation fully reverses the usual presumptions, making
monopoly favored and competition disfavored, the choice to follow a
competitive course would still be open to the public regulatory authority,
provided it concluded that those presumptions were overcome. Once even
this limited form of agency discretion to create competitive markets or submarkets is conceded, the claim that the common carrier concept precludes
237
competitive entry falters.
Furthermore, reading the Communications Act to incorporate the expansive substantive view of the "common carrier concept" would require a
questionable implication of statutory immunity from competition initiated
under regulatory supervision. In the record there is nothing more than
ambiguous support for this reading. Although the 1910, 1921 and 1934
deliberations include frequent recognitions of the monopolistic character of
telephone service at that time, 2 38 substantive contours of that statement were
seldom elaborated upon. The Willis-Graham policy of favoring local geographic monopolies 'in the provision of basic telephone services and
facilities,2 39 while displaying at least a narrow substantive tilt toward monopoly, does not itself reach so far or in as many directions into the industry
237. This understanding of the consequences of extensive regulation is illustrated by the
leading Supreme Court case on telecommunications competition, FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86 (1953). In a passage frequently cited by the advocates of the franchised

monopoly model, see, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 217, at 83; AT&T
Memorandum, supra note 167, at E1357, the Court noted that "[t]he very fact that Congress

has seen fit to enter into the comprehensive regulation of communications embodied in the
Federal Communications Act of 1934 contradicts the notion that national policy unqualifiedly
favors competition in communications." 346 U.S. at 93. This language falls well short of
disapproving the use of competition as a tool for regulating telecommunications. It explicitly
goes no further than to dismantle the presumption that monopoly structures are unlawful; it

does not cast competition into disfavor, much less foreclose its use entirely. The Court
subsequently stated that "the fact that there is substantial regulation does not preclude the
regulatory agency from drawing on competition for complementary or auxiliary support." Id.
238. See text accompanying notes 27-28, 66-67, & 131 supra.
239. See text accompanying notes 69-77 supra.
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structure as the franchised monopoly model would suggest. And while the
1934 Congress made no significant changes in industry structure, neither did
it embrace the existing structure with enthusiasm.2 4° As is clear from the
manner in which it was advanced, 241 the expansive "true faith" form of the
common carrier concept can be discovered only by implication from the
overall course of telecommunications regulation.
In light of the overall federal policy favoring competition, such implications should rarely be given the force of law. As the Supreme Court has
held where comprehensive regulation has been argued as a defense to
antitrust complaints, implied repeal of federal procompetition policies by
regulatory statute should be "strongly disfavored" and should "only [be]
found in cases of plain repugnancy between the [competitive] antitrust
regulatory provisions. '242 The policies underlying this rule in the antitrust
area are even more visible where the issue is implied restriction of agency
discretion to use competition as a regulatory tool, rather than repeal of
judicial jurisdiction over activity which is subject to simultaneous administrative regulation. 243 While there is great potential for institutional conflict
and inconsistent policy direction when both regulators and courts exercise
simultaneous authority over private activity, no such threat is posed by
permitting the agency to consider the degree of competition in the industry
in determining what regulatory actions to take. Any inconsistencies between
the dictates of competitive and monopolistic policies may be mediated by
the agency through application of its broad public interest standard; a
finding that certain activities would have anticompetitive effects may
nevertheless be consistent with the regulators' view of the public interest
and therefore need not control the agency's actions. 244 Thus, although a
colorable argument can be made that regulated entities should be immune
from antitrust suits based on actions in which regulatory agencies have
approved or acquiesced, no similar immunity from agency-supervised
competition can be implied from the fact of regulation. Indeed, if the
regulated entity obtains immunity from judicial regulation of market structure under the antitrust laws, agency authority to regulate market structure
becomes doubly important in a system which is leery of unregulated tele240. See text accompanying notes 213-14 supra.
241. See, e.g., The Great Telephone Debate;Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 217.

242. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 372 (1974).
243. The former constitutes the centerpiece of the challenge to the FCC procompetition
decisions. The latter is the centerpiece of the defense in the current antitrust action brought by
the Justice Department against AT&T. In that action-the more attractive one for accepting the
implied immunity argument, since it concerns judicial regulation-the courts have rejected
AT&T's claim of immunity. See note 100 supra.
244. Indeed, the Supreme Court has ruled that such a finding alone cannot control the
administrative decision. See the discussion of FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86
(1953), at note 237 supra.
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communications markets. Agency discretion to employ competition in that
task should remain unfettered unless the legislature clearly indicates otherwise.
The "common carrier concept" of the "true faith" would curtail that
discretion, not on the basis of the express intent of the Act, but by implication from its overall scheme. Using the "plain repugnancy" test of the
antitrust cases, 24 5 the implication is without merit. Even if the presumptions
against monopoly are withdrawn by pervasive regulation, there can be
nothing plainly repugnant to the Communications Act's task of public
interest regulation for the FCC to regulate with the aim of introducing
increasedcompetition into the telecommunications industry. Without stronger roots for doing so in the express terms of the Act, 246 authorization of
competition cannot be ousted from the Commission's regulatory repertoire
by the simple regulation-means-monopoly formula of the "true faith"
common carrier concept.
There is a further problem with this concept. To a large extent, its
strong intuitive appeal rests on the view that in the "social milieu which
precipitated congressional action" 24 7 in 1934, the milieu which permitted
members of Congress to remark casually and without elaboration that the
telephone industry is a "vast monopoly,''2 4s it was self-evident that most
forms of competition were inappropriate. As an empirical matter, there is
enough evidence of contrariety in the record to raise doubts about whether
this self-evident notion extended very far at all. 249 But to focus on the
empirical validity of this view largely misses the point of asking what the
Communications Act means in relati6n to monopoly and competition.
In today's communications environment what was self-evident in 1934
is no longer self-evident at all. The scope of information resources to which
the Communications Act must apply has been transformed by the modern
technology explosion and the merger of modes of communications exemplified by compunications, cable broadcasting and microwave systems.
How national goals of making available "adequate facilities at reasonable
charges," "national defense" and "promoting safety of life and property"
will be advanced in this new enviornment-assuming that those remain the
central requirements of present and future communications servicescannot be answered with any meaning by reference to whatever underlying
sense of things existed in 1934, regardless of whether that sense tilted
toward monopoly or toward competition. The risks of ossification are
245. See text accompanying note 242 supra.

246. Again, it should be noted that legislation to provide such express roots has been
introduced in the 95th Congress. See note 10 supra.
247. Brief for NARUC, supra note 10, at 30.
248. S. REP. No. 781, supra note 95, at 2.
249. See notes 131-38 supra.
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already large enough in a system where communications regulation is
controlled by legal concepts designed for the problems of nineteenth century
barge and rail traffic. 5 0 If it is the case that an abstract "common carrier
concept" made the self-evident understandings of the early era of communications technology dispositive with regard to the telecommunications industry structure, the regulatory process established by the Communications Act
would be exposed to even greater incapacity to deal with dramatic new
developments within its jurisdiction.
There is no good reason to think the Communications Act was intended
to reach this result. The much more reasonable view of the Act is that its aim
was to create a durable mechanism for shaping the development of the
evolving telecommunications industry to ends determined in the final analysis by public rather than private interests. Tying that mechanism to the
structure of the industry that existed when it was created-by virtue of a
"common carrier concept" or otherwise-would run counter to the fundamental purposes of public regulation. If there is any "more jurisprudential"
way to think about the Communications Act,2 ' that should be it.
V.

CONCLUSION: COMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY

To the uninitiated, the debate over the original intent of the Communications Act may seem arcane and antiquated. 252 But it is a debate that
matters. It matters to courts charged with the unenviable task of divining the
policy in the existing communications laws to deal with problems that go to
the heart of industry structure. It matters to legislators who are being asked
to "reaffirm" the basic policy of the Act by partisans who offer diametrically opposite views of what that basic policy was. And it matters to the
regulatory agencies: to the FCC, whose job it is to apply statutory communications policy in the first instance, and to state regulators, whose range of
authority in the imprecise balance between state and federal control of
communications developments is at stake in important ways. Until the
Communications Act is revamped or replaced, or until the Supreme Court
250. See text accompanying note 41 supra. See Berman, supra note 129, at 165. See also
Washington Util. & Transp. Co. v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142, 1157 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 836 (1976) ("Regulatory practices and policies that will serve the 'public interest' today
may be quite different from those that were adequate to that purpose in 1910, 1927, or 1934, or
that may further the public interest in the future").
251. See note 233 supra.
252. As one exponent of the "true faith" puts it, "[arguments about 'original intent' are
usually pedantic and rather unconvincing at best." The Great Telephone Debate 65. See also
Letter from Donald I. Baker, Assistant Attorney General, to Rep. Timothy R. Wirth (Jan. 18,
1977), reprinted in 123 CONG. REc. E409 (daily ed., Jan. 27, 1977) ("the legislative history of
broad, general statutes enacted nearly a half a century before is unlikely to be dispositive of
many present day questions").
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chooses to speak, the search for the original intent will remain the central
preoccupation in the challenge to the FCC competition decisions.
There are two conclusions to draw from the search. First, to the extent
that a judgment is permissible, the more convincing view of the Act is that it
contains no per se prohibition on FCC discretion to follow a policy of
introducing competition in telecommunications. From a purely legal point
of view, there are no persuasive reasons to find that the broad FCC discre'ion found in the traditional view of the Act heretically distorts the "true
faith."
The second conclusion is that there can be no great confidence in the
first. The search for the Act's original intent offers little promise of discovery; neither the statute nor its legislative history provide much useful
guidance. The relevant law is more to be fashioned than found.
At this point, the search for the law of telecommunications underlying
the FCC's procompetitive line of decisions comes full circle:,the elucidation
of what the terms of the Communications Act mean for this area of policy
formulation ultimately comes to rest on questions which have more to do
with policy and political judgments than on legal sources and methods.
Some of the questions-such as who is to make the decisions on market
structure-involve structural issues about the regulatory process. Somesuch as what is the correct policy to follow- involve substantive issues that
draw on extra-legal factors for resolution. But all of them reflect a balancing
of options and consequences that is fundamentally political and for which
the Communications Act as presently written can only provide a backdrop.
Both the FCC and the players it regulates-as well as the courts which
review the outcome-deserve better from Congress. In the 100 years since
Alexander Graham Bell launched the telecommunications revolution,
Congress has never once given even superficial attention to the unique set of
problems and potentials presented by the telephone and its descendents.
Whether or not it takes the brute force of the established carriers or the
development of a crisis to spur a thorough legislative consideration of this
aspect of information resources policy, the first order of responsibility for
policy-oriented judgments of the type underlying the Carterfone and
Specialized Common Carrier decisions remains with Congress. If the
Communications Act and its predecessors teach any enduring lesson, it is
that this responsibility has yet to be discharged.

